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1
Introduction
Trends and Prior Evidence
Employee ownership is a situation in which employees have an
ownership stake in the firm where they work, through holdings of firm
stock. It is a channel through which employees share in the profits of
the firm and can vote on important firm decisions and otherwise have
increased participation in workplace decisions. The focus of this book
is on broad-based employee ownership—that is, ownership of stock not
just by top-level managers but by workers at all levels of a firm’s hierarchy. The past several decades have witnessed growth in broad-based
employee participation in the financial performance of firms, both in the
United States and in other advanced countries.

WHY DO WE CARE?
There are four broad sources of interest in employee ownership:
1) Increased economic performance. Since employee ownership shares the overall pie with employees of the firm, participation in employee ownership can motivate employees to
work harder to increase the size of the pie, primarily through
increased productivity. Employee ownership can thus alleviate principal-agent problems in the workplace. By tying
worker pay to profits, the incentives of workers and owners
can become aligned so that productivity-reducing conflict is
minimized and productivity-enhancing cooperation and innovation are encouraged. Better outcomes can occur through
higher worker effort, lower absenteeism and turnover, and
greater worker commitment and willingness to share information and cooperate with management. There should be
especially strong effects if employee ownership is combined
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with employee participation in decisions (combining “residual
control” with “residual returns”) (Holmstrom and Milgrom
1994; Jensen and Meckling 1992; Milgrom and Roberts 1990;
Prendergast 2002).
2) Greater job security and firm survival. Employee ownership
may enhance firm survival and employment stability, through
greater compensation flexibility and higher productivity. If so,
this can help decrease unemployment and increase macroeconomic stability in the overall economy, creating positive externalities that can justify supportive public policy.
3) More-broadly shared prosperity. Employee ownership can
broaden access to capital income and broaden the distribution
of income and wealth. The notion of workers sharing in firm
profits has historical roots in the infancy of U.S. capitalism.
The founders of the United States believed that broad sharing in ownership and economic rewards was vital to a thriving
democracy (Blasi, Freeman, and Kruse 2013). Albert Gallatin,
before becoming U.S. Treasury secretary under Thomas Jefferson, instituted a profit-sharing plan in 1795 at his Pennsylvania
Glass Works, with the belief that such a system was important for the newly developing U.S. democracy. Broadening
the distribution of wealth was a key reason for the creation of
employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) by Louis Kelso and
their institutionalization in the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), spearheaded by Sen. Russell
Long of Louisiana.
4) Lower labor-management conflict and higher quality of
work life. Employee ownership may help to create a more
harmonious work site, with less labor-management conflict
because of increased alignment of incentives. Employees may
also benefit from increased job security and control of their
work lives. To the extent that employee ownership increases
employee participation in workplace decisions, this may also
help to strengthen democracy by increasing employees’ civic
skills and interest in participating in politics, as argued by the
political scientist Carole Pateman (1970).
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Because of the above sources of interest, a number of countries
give tax incentives to promote employee ownership. The European
Union (EU) highlighted employee ownership and profit sharing in its
four reports from 1991 to 2008 known as the PEPPER (Promotion of
Employee Participation in Profits and Enterprise Results) Reports. It
called on member states to promote participation by employed persons in profits and enterprise performance. Employee ownership can
improve individual firm performance, which provides a rationale for
firms to adopt these performance-enhancing practices, and public policy can play a valuable role in spreading this information. Furthermore,
there is a very strong case to be made for supportive public policy of
employee ownership if employee ownership firms lay off fewer workers and are more likely to survive, since the economic and social costs
of layoffs and firm failures are borne by workers, families, communities, and the larger economy and society. In economic terms, the layoffs
and firm failures create negative externalities that can justify the use of
supportive public policies. In addition, a policy case can be built on the
third source of interest listed above—increasing broad-based prosperity, which can reduce inequality and strengthen democracy. We discuss
the policy implications further in the concluding chapter, taking all of
these arguments into account.
There are nonetheless concerns about employee ownership that
may limit the interest of companies and policymakers. The two principal concerns are these:
1) The free rider problem. The individual incentive to be a “free
rider” in group incentives grows with the size of the group.
This is also often called the “1/N problem,” since in a group
incentive plan with N workers the average worker will receive
only 1/N of the extra rewards generated by his or her individual effort. This may be counteracted by workplace norms and
company policies to encourage cooperation, higher effort, and
monitoring of fellow workers, as will be discussed.
2) Financial risk. Stock values can obviously go up and down,
and having a large share of one’s wealth in any one asset—
including the stock of one’s employer—means that one may
face financial risk by not being appropriately diversified. The
financial risk may be increased under employee ownership,
since if the firm fails the employee can lose both his or her job
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and the company stock value. While this is an important concern and deserves attention in policy, we will review theoretical and empirical evidence that it does not appear to be a major
problem in practice.

PLAN OF THE BOOK
This book presents new evidence focused on the second major
source of interest listed above: the stability and survival of employeeownership firms. These topics are the most relevant to discussions of
public policy support for employee ownership, given the potential
broader benefits for the economy and society. In the remainder of this
chapter, we provide an overview of the major types of employee ownership and prior evidence relevant to each of the four sources of interest
and the two main objections. Following a brief history and overview of
the prevalence of employee ownership in Chapter 2, we present new
data on the relationship of employee ownership to employment stability in Chapter 3, and of employee ownership to firm survival in Chapter
4. We further probe these results in Chapter 5 in order to understand
the role of compensation flexibility and higher productivity as potential
explanations for the greater stability and survival of employee ownership firms. Apart from helping us interpret the stability and survival
results, the evidence in Chapter 5 also sheds light on the first source of
interest identified above—improving economic performance—by analyzing the relationship of employee ownership to productivity, and it
sheds light on the financial risk objection by assessing pay levels and
flexibility in employee ownership companies. Chapter 6 concludes with
a summary of our key results and their implications for public policy.

WHAT IS MEANT BY “EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP”?
There is great variety in the types and extent of employee ownership. The extent of employee ownership within a firm can vary along
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three dimensions: 1) the percentage of the company owned by employees (from a minority stake to 100 percent ownership), 2) the percentage
of employees who participate in ownership (from a minority to 100 percent), and 3) the distribution of shares among employee owners (from
perfect equality to a very unequal distribution where one manager owns
the majority of stock and each of the other employees owns only a small
amount). Regarding Dimension 1, in this study we measure the percentage of publicly held companies owned by broad-based plans, so that we
can examine the effects of the percentage of company owned. Because
they are publicly held companies, none are 100 percent employee
owned, and most have only a small percentage owned by employees.
Regarding Dimensions 2 and 3, we include only broad-based employee
ownership as defined by pension rules governing coverage, so that all or
most employees will be included and the distribution of ownership will
generally be proportional to pay and tenure.
Overall, an estimated 22.9 million employees, or almost one-fifth of
U.S. private sector employees, own stock in the companies they work
for (the prevalence will be explored more fully in Chapter 2). Employee
ownership programs can take several different forms, summarized in
Table 1.1.
• One of the most prevalent forms of employee ownership in the
United States is the ESOP. In an ESOP, ERISA allows companies to contribute company stock, or money to buy stock, to an
Table 1.1 Population Covered by Various Employee Ownership Plans
Types of employee ownership
Number of employees covered in U.S.
ESOPs
10.6 million
401(k) plans
5.7 million
Other pension plans
184,000
Employee stock purchase plans
Unknown
Worker cooperatives
About 7,500
Individual purchases on open market Unknown
Stock held after exercising
8.5 million stock option holders,
stock options
though the number holding stock after
exercising their option is unknown
Any employee ownership
22.9 million
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.
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employee pension trust, or to borrow money to fund employee
ownership and then repay it in installments from company revenues. Under this approach, workers generally gain an ownership stake without investing their own money to buy the stock
(although in a small minority of cases they have taken wage or
benefit concessions to fund the stock purchase) (Blasi and Kruse
1991). As of 2012, there were 10.6 million employee participants in ESOPs (USDOL 2015).
Apart from ESOPs, employee ownership may occur through the
following ways:
• In 401(k) retirement pension plans, companies may match pretax employee contributions with company stock, and employees
may choose to invest some of their own contributions in company stock. As of 2012, there were 5.7 million employee participants in non-ESOP 401(k) plans with employer stock (Table 2.2
in Chapter 2).
• In other pension plans, such as deferred profit-sharing plans without a 401(k) option, the company invests a portion of the profitsharing contribution into company stock. These are rare: in 2012,
there were only 184,000 participants in non-ESOP, non-401(k)
pension plans with employer stock (Table 2.2 in Chapter 2).
• Employee stock purchase plans (ESPPs) typically offer stock
at a 10 to 15 percent discount to the stock market price so that
employees can acquire ownership through individual decisions
to purchase company stock. About half of all large companies in
the United States offer ESPPs, and an average of 30 percent of
employees in these companies participate in the ESPP (Babenko
and Sen 2014).
• Worker cooperatives are 100 percent—or nearly 100 percent—
worker-owned companies in which workers invest in ownership stakes and typically make decisions based on one-person/
one-vote, rather than having voting rights based on number of
shares of stock. These are much less common than other forms
of employee ownership; an attempted census of U.S. cooperatives found that they had a total of only about 7,500 employees
in 2009 (Deller et al. 2009), although they are more common in
several other countries.
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• Employees can make individual purchases of company stock on
the open market.
• Employees can exercise their stock options. Stock options give
them the right to buy company stock at a preset strike price after
a specific vesting period. Once the vesting period is over, the
worker has the choice to exercise the stock option—i.e., to exercise his or her right to buy the stock at the preset strike price and
sell at the going market stock price. The worker will have an
incentive to exercise the stock option when the market price is
above the strike price and thereby obtain a positive payoff. In this
way, the employee gets the upside gain of a rise in share price
without the downside risk of losing part of his or her investment.
An important point is that stock-option holdings only constitute employee ownership if and when they are exercised, which
would only occur when the stock price goes above the strike
price and the exerciser exercises the option but continues to hold
the stock. Thus, stock options could lead to employee ownership,
but they do not strictly constitute employee ownership in and of
themselves. Therefore, when we present descriptive statistics or
figures on stock options in this book, we will always treat stock
options separately rather than including them in our statistics
or figures on employee ownership. Unlike direct purchases of
company stock, stock options are not purchased with employee
savings unless they are used for wage substitution. While stock
options are most common in executive compensation, a number
of companies—particularly high-tech companies—have implemented broad-based plans that distribute stock options to all
or most employees. As of 2014, there were about 8.5 million
employees holding stock options (Table 2.1 in Chapter 2).

WHAT DOES THE EVIDENCE SHOW?
Previous empirical research has shown employee ownership to be
linked to a multitude of improved outcomes. There are several alternative methods that have been used in this research:
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• Compare employee owners to individuals who are not employee
owners.
• Compare outcomes at firms that have employee ownership to
otherwise comparable firms that do not have such programs.
• Follow firms longitudinally and compare them before and after
adoption of employee ownership relative to firms that did not
adopt employee ownership.
• Employ laboratory or field experiments to examine the link
between financial participation and performance outcomes.
On the following pages is an overview of prior evidence for each of
the four major sources of interest—1) increased economic performance,
2) greater job security and firm survival, 3) shared prosperity, and
4) lower labor-management conflict and higher quality of work life—
and for the two major objections (free riding and financial risk). We
start each section with some results from the General Social Survey
(GSS), which illustrate the basic relationship between employee ownership and outcomes of interest, and then provide more detail on the indepth scholarly research. The GSS is a nationally representative survey
conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University
of Chicago. The GSS is conducted every two years on approximately
1,500 adults and includes questions on a wide variety of topics on
social, demographic, and economic factors, such as political and civic
participation, life satisfaction, and work habits. The GSS included several questions on employee ownership, stock options, and profit sharing in 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014, which are useful in illustrating the
trends and potential effects of these pay systems.1
Economic performance. The GSS results in Figure 1.1 are consistent with the popular view that employees tend to work harder and
raise productivity under employee ownership. Survey respondents were
asked how hard they thought their coworkers worked. Respondents
who were employee owners reported that their coworkers had higher
average effort (on a 0–10 scale) than was reported by employee nonowners. It is important to note that this question does not reveal whether
the other workers at the respondent’s workplace also participate in
employee ownership; however, employee ownership programs tend to
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Figure 1.1 Workplace Effort and Employee Ownership

Mean level of workplace effort on 0–10 scale

7.4
7.3

Employee owner

7.2

Not employee owner

7.1
7.0
6.9
6.8
6.7
6.6
6.5
6.4
6.3

2002

2006

NOTE: Data are based on responses to the General Social Survey (GSS) variable
cowrkhrd, which asks, “At your workplace, how hard would you say that people
work, with 0 meaning not at all hard and 10 meaning very hard?” (The GSS asked this
question only in 2002 and 2006.) This figure illustrates mean response by employee
ownership.
SOURCE: Data are from the GSS on employees at private firms.

be implemented at the workplace level, so it is likely that most of an
employee-owner respondent’s coworkers are also employee owners.
The results of this simple comparison are consistent with prior studies that demonstrate a positive association between employee ownership and company performance. Two reviews of the employee ownership literature have concluded that “two-thirds of 129 studies (including
both performance and attitude studies) on employee ownership and its
consequences found favorable effects relating to employee ownership, while one-tenth found negative effects” (Kaarsemaker 2006) and
“research on ESOPs and employee ownership is overwhelmingly positive and largely credible” (Freeman 2007). Formal meta-analyses that
statistically test the combined results of studies have found strong evidence of a positive association between employee ownership and per-
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formance (Doucouliagos 1995; Kruse and Blasi 1997; O’Boyle, Patel,
and Gonzalez-Mulé, forthcoming).
Examples of individual studies include one sponsored by the United
Kingdom Treasury (Oxera Consulting 2007a,b,c) that aimed to understand whether government policies that encouraged firms to introduce
employee ownership improved firm performance. The study obtained
data from confidential tax records, and its examination of tax-advantaged
share schemes at more than 16,000 UK firms reveals that broad-based
employee ownership improves firm performance measures such as
value-added and turnover. A parallel study using publicly available
data on British corporations with broad-based employee ownership
finds similar results. It also finds that the effects were greatly influenced
by the delegation of decision-making autonomy from management to
employees (Bryson and Freeman 2010). Also, Jones and Kato (1995)
examine the effect of broad-based employee stock ownership plans by
estimating production functions using a panel of Japanese firms; they
find that the introduction of an ESOP resulted in a 4–5 percent increase
in productivity and that this productivity payoff took from three to four
years to actualize. In the United States, a study by Blasi, Freeman, and
Kruse (2013) examined 300 privately held firms that set up ESOPs
between 1988 and 1994, comparing each ESOP firm to a similar company of the same size and in the same industry without an ESOP. This
study finds that ESOP firms have significantly higher sales growth and
higher sales per worker than matching firms without ESOPs.
Of course, correlation does not imply causation. For example, companies may have good performance even before adopting employee
ownership, so that good performance is a cause rather than consequence
of employee ownership. To address this possibility, many studies have
used longitudinal data that compare performance before and after the
adoption of a plan, or that examine other variation in employee ownership over time (e.g., in percentage covered or size of stakes), and have
found that performance improves after employee ownership is adopted
or expanded. While these studies control for anything special about the
firm that does not change over time, there may be other factors that
affect the firm’s choice of when to adopt a participatory pay plan, and
that may be responsible for any performance changes. To address this
possibility, many of the studies on this topic have used special methods
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to adjust for any statistical bias, and these studies have continued to find
generally positive results.2
Another potentially confounding factor is that higher-quality workers may be more likely to join participatory pay firms, and the higher
firm performance may be due to the presence of better workers rather
than the direct effect of employee ownership. If employee ownership
does attract better workers, this could be a good reason for an individual
firm to adopt employee ownership, but it does not provide a strong case
for policy support, since any expansion of employee ownership may be
essentially reshuffling workers among firms and not raising overall performance of the economy. While this issue of worker self-selection has
not been examined in the context of employee ownership, there have
been two studies of other group incentives that have found that average worker quality does not change as compensation is changed from
individual to group incentives, whereas average worker performance
improves under the group incentives (Hansen 1997; Weiss 1987).
The interpretation that employee ownership increases productivity
on average is supported by findings on employees’ performance-related
behaviors. A study of over 40,000 workers finds that those who owned
company stock are more likely to say they would take action if they saw
a fellow worker not working well, by talking to the worker, a supervisor, or members of the work team (Freeman, Kruse, and Blasi 2010).
This result occurred both before and after controlling for a wide variety
of job and personal characteristics. The idea that shared rewards is a
causal factor was strongly supported in employee reports of why they
would take such actions (e.g., “Poor performance will cost me and other
employees in bonus or stock value”). Employee owners also reported
lower levels of turnover, more pride and loyalty to the company, greater
willingness to work hard to help the company, and more suggestions
to improve performance (Blasi et al. 2010). While this study does not
find lower absenteeism among employee owners, a French study finds
that employee ownership plans were linked to reductions in employee
absenteeism (Brown, Fakhfakh, and Sessions 1999).
All the studies described above are based on field research on actual
firms and workers participating in employee ownership. While these
studies control for many observable factors, it is always possible that
there are some unobserved factors affecting the results. These unobserved factors can be fully ruled out only in a true experiment with
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random assignment. While random assignment of employee ownership in actual work settings would be extremely difficult to implement,
laboratory experiments have found higher productivity among subjects
randomly assigned to be in employee-owned “firms” (Frohlich et al.
1998; Mellizo 2013), suggesting that there can be true causal effects of
employee ownership on performance.
Job Security and Firm Survival. The GSS results show that both
actual layoffs (Figure 1.2) and the perceived likelihood of layoff (Figure
1.3) are lower for employee-owners than for nonowners. As we can see
in Figure 1.2, in each year, workers who participated in employee ownership programs indicated a lower incidence of losing their jobs than
workers who were not employee owners. For example, in 2002, 3.0
percent of employee owners reported being laid off from their jobs in
the past year compared to 9.2 percent of non–employee owners. In each
Figure 1.2 Layoffs and Employee Ownership
14

Percentage laid off in previous year

12

Employee owner
Not employee owner

10
8
6
4
2
0

2002

2006

2010

2014

NOTE: Layoff information based on the GSS variable laidoff, which indicates whether
the employee was laid off from his or her main job at any time in the past year. Figure
illustrates mean response by employee ownership.
SOURCE: Data are from the GSS on employees at private firms.
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Figure 1.3 Perceived Likelihood of Layoff and Employee Ownership
18

Employee owner

Not employee owner

Percentage of respondents indicating a high
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NOTE: Layoff information based on the GSS variable joblose, which asks the respondent how likely he/she is to lose his/her job in the coming year. Responses “very
likely” and “fairly likely” were coded as high layoff likelihood, while responses “not
too likely” and “not at all likely” were coded as low layoff likelihood. Figure illustrates mean response by employee ownership.
SOURCE: Data are from the GSS on employees at private firms.

year, employee ownership participants also reported a lower likelihood
of losing their jobs than workers who were not employee owners, as
seen in Figure 1.3. For example, in 2002, 12.2 percent of GSS respondents who were employee owners indicated a high layoff likelihood
in the coming year (either “very likely” or “fairly likely”), while 15.3
percent of non–employee owners reported a high layoff likelihood. The
difference in actual layoffs is particularly strong in the Great Recession
year of 2010, when 12.3 percent of nonowners reported being laid off
in the past year compared to only 2.6 percent of employee owners. One
potential criticism of the layoff comparisons is that this difference may
reflect the greater average job tenure of employee owners, since the
nonowners may be new employees who are more likely to be laid off
in recessions. The results are maintained, however, when restricted to
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employees with more than one year of tenure, and when controlling for
tenure, occupation, gender, race, age, and education.
Employee ownership may be linked to lower layoffs because of
enhanced company employment stability and survival. Employee ownership may lead to this in at least four related ways, including 1) increasing
productivity through greater cooperation, information sharing, and commitment (Pierce, Rubenfeld, and Morgan 1991); 2) reducing dysfunctional workplace conflict that can contribute to firm failure; 3) increasing
employee investments in valuable firm-specific skills; and 4) creating
a workplace culture that instills a sense of psychological ownership,
with a corresponding commitment to preserve employee jobs whenever
possible.
Prior evidence from U.S. studies shows that firms with employee
ownership have higher survival rates: public companies with substantial
employee ownership stakes in 1983 were 20 percent more likely than
closely matched industry pairs to survive through 1995 (Blair, Kruse,
and Blasi 2002), and those with substantial employee ownership stakes
in 1988 were 21 percent more likely to survive through 2001 (Park,
Kruse, and Sesil 2004). A study that focused on closely held firms used
a similar methodology of matching ESOP and non-ESOP companies
in the same industry and found that ESOP companies in 1988 were
only half as likely as non-ESOP firms to go bankrupt or close over
the 1988–1999 period, and only three-fifths as likely to disappear for
any reason (Blasi, Freeman, and Kruse 2013). These three studies also
found greater employment stability among the employee ownership
firms compared to their same-industry pairs, as measured by the standard deviation of the logarithm of employment. Also, Welbourne and
Cyr (1999) found that among companies with initial public offerings
in 1988, those with broad-based employee ownership had higher survival rates. A study of S corporations with ESOPs over the 2006–2011
period found that they had higher average employment growth in the
2006–2008 prerecession period than did the economy as a whole, and
they also had faster growth following the recession from 2009 to 2011
(Brill 2012, p. 6).
The greater stability of employee ownership firms is linked to substantially lower government costs for unemployment compensation and
forgone tax revenues. An analysis based on the GSS results in combination with government data on unemployment compensation and tax
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rates concludes that “based on the estimated cost of each unemployed
worker, the implied federal savings from the lower layoff rates for
employee owners is $23.3 billion for the recession year 2010 and $13.7
billion per year for the longer 2002–2010 period” (Employee Ownership Foundation 2013; Rosen 2013).
Apart from these U.S. results on stability and survival, there have
been four studies of worker cooperatives outside the United States that
have found high survival rates compared to conventional firms. These
were studies of worker cooperatives in several countries by Ben-Ner
(1988), in the United Kingdom by Thomas and Cornforth (1989), in
France by Pérotin (2004), and in Uruguay by Burdín (2014). The last
of these studies analyzed a long panel of administrative firm-level data
maintained by the government and found that worker cooperatives had
a 29 percent lower rate of dissolution than did conventional firms, and
that the higher survival rate is associated with greater employment
stability.
More-broadly shared prosperity. Employee ownership will not
enhance worker incomes if it substitutes for standard worker pay or
benefits. In this case it presents serious issues of financial risk, since
variable pay is being substituted for fixed pay (although financial risk
may nonetheless be reduced by greater job security, as will be discussed). While a common perception is that employee ownership will
substitute for other forms of compensation, the evidence indicates that
employee ownership tends to come on top of market levels of pay. The
GSS data in Figure 1.4 provide a simple comparison to illustrate this
point. Employee-owners are slightly more likely than non–employee
owners to report that their fixed pay levels are at or above market levels,
meaning that the employee ownership comes on top of market levels of
fixed pay for most workers.
There are some cases in which employee ownership is used as part
of wage or benefit concessions, but these are rare (despite the media
attention paid to several cases).3 A comprehensive longitudinal study
of all ESOP adoptions over the period 1980–2001 finds that employee
wages (excluding ESOP contributions) either increased (for small
ESOPs) or stayed constant (for large ESOPs) after adoption, controlling for state-level and industry-level wage changes and other company
characteristics (Kim and Ouimet 2014). Consistent with this, cross-
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Figure 1.4 Employee Ownership and Fixed Pay Relative to Market
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NOTE: Data are based on the GSS variable compwage, which asks “Do you believe
your fixed annual wages last year were higher or lower than those of employees with
similar experience and job descriptions in other companies in your region? Please
answer on a 1-to-5 scale.” Responses of “4” or “5” were classified as “fixed pay
above market,” and answers of “3” or more were classified as “fixed pay at or above
market.” Figure illustrates mean response by employee ownership.
SOURCE: Data are from the 2014 wave of the GSS on employees at private firms.

sectional comparisons of matched ESOP and non-ESOP firms have
found similar levels of pay and other benefits in the two types of firms,
so that ESOPs appear to come on top of other worker pay and benefits
(Kardas, Scharf, and Keogh 1998; Scharf and Mackin 2000).
Apart from ESOPs, employee ownership in general is linked to
higher overall pay. More detailed analysis of the GSS data, with controls for job and demographic characteristics, finds that employee owners have higher levels of yearly earnings and are more likely to say
they are “paid what they deserve” and that their fringe benefits are
good (Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi 2010, p. 266). Other cross-sectional
studies find that employee ownership is associated with higher aver-
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age compensation levels (Blasi, Conte, and Kruse 1996), pension assets
(Kroumova 2000), and overall worker wealth (Buchele et al. 2010).
For example, a study of more than 40,000 workers finds that an
extra dollar of employee ownership value is associated with an extra 94
cents of wealth, indicating that there is very little substitution between
employee ownership and other forms of wealth; thus, employee-owned
stock appears to add to wealth in general (Buchele et al. 2010). While
some of these forms of employee ownership involve workers directly
purchasing stock (such as in Employee Stock Purchase Plans), such
purchases are generally done on favorable terms for the employees
(e.g., with discounts). The clear evidence that ESOP participants receive
stock on top of regular compensation, and that employee owners in general receive higher pay, indicates that employee ownership generally
does not substitute for regular fixed pay.
How can this be? How is it possible that employee ownership can
simply add to, rather than substitute for, other forms of pay or wealth?
One interpretation that integrates the accumulated evidence about
worker behavior, productivity, and pay levels is based on theories of
reciprocity and gift exchange. The idea that reciprocity is important in
economic and social relationships receives strong support from laboratory and field studies (Axelrod 1984; Fehr and Gächter 2000; Gintis et
al. 2005). This idea has been formalized in the efficiency wage model
of “gift exchange,” in which workers respond to the “gift” of abovemarket compensation with a reciprocal “gift” of high effort and cooperation to benefit the firm and fellow workers (Akerlof 1982). There
has been substantial empirical evidence in support of efficiency wage
models of the labor market (as shown by the meta-analysis in Peach and
Stanley [2009]). Giving employees the opportunity to own stock on top
of regular compensation may be an especially effective “gift” for creating and reinforcing a sense of common purpose and encouraging higher
commitment and productivity (Blasi et al. 2010). This is consistent with
the studies finding higher average productivity under employee ownership, summarized above. Recent evidence lends further support to this
interpretation, finding that positive effects of employee ownership on
attitudes and behaviors are much more likely to occur when employee
ownership comes on top of market-level wages and benefits (Weltmann,
Blasi, and Kruse 2015).

18 Kurtulus and Kruse

The consistent finding that employee ownership tends to be “gravy”
on top of other pay and wealth means that it may be a promising means
for increasing worker incomes and wealth in general, which may help
to reduce inequality. A 1986 General Accounting Office (GAO) report
concludes that “the distribution of stock ownership within ESOPs
appears to be broader than is the case in the population at large,” but
that there were too few ESOP participants for this to make a noticeable
difference in the overall distribution of stock ownership or wealth in
general during this time—a time when ESOPs had just begun (USGAO
1986, p. 43). The first GAO conclusion is supported by more recent
data, which finds that the distribution of wealth among employees in
employee ownership companies is more equal than among all employees or households in general (Buchele et al. 2010). These results suggest that expansion of employee ownership has potential for enhancing
the broad-based sharing of economic prosperity.
Lower labor-management conflict and higher quality of work
life. Employee ownership may help to create a harmonious workplace,
with workers having a greater say in decisions and other improvements
in their workplace experiences.
Does employee ownership in fact create more harmonious workplaces? One study found that strikes were less common in unionized
companies that adopted ESOPs (Cramton, Mehran, and Tracy 2008),
which may reflect the greater financial transparency of unionized ESOP
companies (Bova, Dou, and Hope 2015). Employees tend to give companies higher ratings on management-employee relations and other
aspects of company treatment of employees (e.g., handling of promotions, worker safety, and trustworthiness) when they are employee owners or otherwise participate in shared rewards (Kruse, Freeman, and
Blasi 2010).
Two basic measures of the quality of work life are workers’ turnover intentions and workers’ job satisfaction. The GSS data in Figure
1.5 show the relationship between workers’ turnover intentions and
ownership. In each year, workers with employee ownership indicated
a lower level of intention to find a new job than workers who did not
participate in employee ownership; for example, in 2002, nearly 23 percent of nonemployee owners indicated a high likelihood of turnover
intention, compared to 13 percent of employee owners. This difference
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Figure 1.5 Turnover Intention and Employee Ownership
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NOTE: Turnover intention information is based on the GSS variable trynewjb, which
asks the respondent how likely he or she is to make a genuine effort to find a new job
with another employer within the coming year. The response “very likely” was coded
as high turnover intention, while responses “somewhat likely” and “not at all likely”
were coded as low turnover intention. Figure illustrates mean response by employee
ownership.
SOURCE: Data are from the GSS on employees at private firms.

is maintained over time, although the gap narrows in 2014. A more
detailed analysis of the turnover data shows that employees who are
owners are less likely than other employees to say they will look for a
new job, after controlling for detailed job and personal characteristics
(Blasi et al. 2010). In addition, a recent analysis of the “Great Place
to Work” data set—which includes more than 700 firms and 230,000
workers—shows that worker intent to stay with the company is significantly higher in ESOP companies than in non-ESOP companies (Blasi,
Freeman, and Kruse 2016).
The relation of employee ownership to the other basic measure of
the quality of work life—job satisfaction—is illustrated in Figure 1.6.
This shows that employee ownership and job satisfaction are positively
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Figure 1.6 Job Satisfaction and Employee Ownership
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NOTE: Data are based on the GSS variable satjob1, which asks how satisfied employees are with their jobs on a scale of 1 (“not at all”) to 4 (“very”). The figure illustrates
mean job satisfaction by year.
SOURCE: Data are from the GSS on employees at private firms.

related in the 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014 waves of the GSS. The difference between employee owners and non–employee owners is very
small, however, in 2010 and 2014, which could reflect low stock values
and uncertainty following the Great Recession.
Further probing of the job satisfaction and turnover intention results
shows that any favorable effects of employee ownership appear to be
very dependent on the presence of other supportive workplace policies.
An index combining employee ownership and stock options with other
shared rewards (profit sharing and gainsharing) was found to predict
higher job satisfaction and lower turnover intentions only when combined with high-performance work policies (employee involvement,
training, and job security) and low levels of supervision; without such
policies, the effect on job satisfaction was in fact negative (Blasi et al.
2010; Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi 2010).
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This latter result may reflect mixed messages to employees when
they are given employee ownership or stock options without supportive
workplace policies: “We want you to be more productive as employeeowners, but we’re not going to give you the tools to be more productive,
and we’re going to keep a close eye on you” (Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi
2010, pp. 274–275). In such cases, employee ownership may be seen
primarily as an attempt to shift financial risk onto workers, rather than
to empower workers.
Therefore, an important question is whether employee ownership
is generally accompanied by supportive workplace policies. The GSS
data show that employee financial participation goes hand in hand with
workplace practices that empower workers with the ability to improve
workplace performance (and thereby increase their payoff from having
a share in company ownership), particularly employee involvement in
decision making and firm-sponsored employee training. One of the 2006
GSS survey questions asks the following: “Some companies have organized workplace decision-making in ways to get more employee input
and involvement. Are you personally involved in any group, team, committee, or task force that addresses issues such as product quality, cost
cutting, productivity, health and safety, or another workplace issue?”
Forty-three percent of employee owners responded affirmatively to this
question in 2006, and 34 percent did so in 2014, compared to only 28
percent and 29 percent in those two years among nonowners, as seen in
Figure 1.7. A similar relationship exists with respect to firm-sponsored
employee training. As seen in Figure 1.8, nearly 65 percent of employee
owners in 2006 reported that they had received formal training from
their current employers in the past year, and 69 percent did so in 2014,
compared to only 44 percent and 42 percent of nonowners in those two
years. These relationships are strongly maintained when controlling for
other job and personal characteristics (Bryson and Freeman 2010; Dube
and Freeman 2010; Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi 2010).
The higher prevalence of participation in decision making and
training among employee owners suggests that there are complementarities of these policies with financial participation. Most basically, this
points to the importance of providing employee owners with the means
to improve performance—through increased skills and opportunities
for input—so that they can effectively take action in response to the
financial incentives. In the language of economics, “residual control”
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Figure 1.7 Employee Involvement in Decision Making and Employee
Ownership
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NOTE: Data are based on the GSS variable empinput, which asks, “Some companies
have organized workplace decision-making in ways to get more employee input and
involvement. Are you personally involved in any group, team, committee, or task
force that addresses issues such as product quality, cost cutting, productivity, health
and safety, or another workplace issue?” The figure illustrates the share of employees
who responded affirmatively to this question.
SOURCE: Data are from the GSS on employees at private firms.

should be combined with “residual returns” in order to provide proper
incentives. As noted earlier, prior evidence has supported the idea that
employee involvement, training, and job security combine with shared
rewards in improving performance-related attitudes and behaviors.
In summary of the literature on labor-management conflict and
quality of work life, the above results—plus other studies reviewed in
Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi (2010)—indicate that employee ownership
is linked to the following results:
• fewer strikes and better evaluations of workplace relations
• lower turnover and higher job satisfaction, but only when shared
rewards are combined with high-performance policies
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Figure 1.8 Employer-Sponsored Training and Employee Ownership
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NOTE: Data are based on the GSS variable emptrain, which asks, “In the last 12
months, have you received any formal training from your current employer, such as
in classes or seminars sponsored by the employer?” The figure illustrates the share of
employees who responded affirmatively to this question.
SOURCE: Data are from the GSS on employees at private firms.

• greater employee participation in decisions
• higher likelihood of company-sponsored training
• higher levels of pay
• higher job security
Free rider problem. Group incentives can clearly dilute the individual incentive to work hard, and thereby they can hamper productivity gains from share plans. However, as discussed above in the review
of evidence on economic performance, it does not appear to prevent
employee ownership firms from having higher productivity on average. Game theory shows that the free rider problem (an example of the
“prisoner’s dilemma”) can be overcome in a cooperative equilibrium in
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which everyone can agree on and enforce high work norms (Axelrod
1984; Fudenberg and Maskin 1986). Such cooperation may be created
and maintained by policies that build team spirit, loyalty, and peer pressure to perform well. This idea is supported by the finding that positive
effects of group incentives on attitudes and behaviors are more likely
to occur when employees are covered by high-performance work policies (employee involvement, training, and job security) and are given
freedom to work without close supervision (Blasi et al. 2010). In addition, the finding that employee owners are more likely than nonowners
to take action against shirking coworkers indicates that the free rider
problem is often overcome by worker comonitoring and enforcement
of higher norms.
Financial risk. The financial risk that can result from tying worker
pay and wealth to firm performance is an important concern. A fundamental premise of portfolio theory is that portfolios should be structured to balance risk and reward, and that diversification is important
to mitigate risk. Having a large portion of one’s wealth portfolio in
any one asset means that the portfolio may not be properly diversified,
and a plunge in the value of that asset can cause a significant decline
in the portfolio’s overall value. The financial risk may be greater with
employer stock than with other assets, since if the company does poorly
the worker could lose his or her job along with a decline in wealth, possibly endangering his or her retirement security.
It is undoubtedly true that some workers have too much of their
wealth tied up in a single asset and thus are not properly diversified. For
example, each year many people use some or all of their life savings
to start their own businesses. As with entrepreneurs who are heavily
invested in their businesses, employee ownership may sometimes contribute to improper diversification. The financial risk from employee
ownership, however, does not appear to be a major problem in practice,
as indicated by the following research findings:
Employee ownership generally comes on top of standard pay
and benefits. It is important to reemphasize that workers do not pay for
stock with their wages or savings in ESOPs, the most prevalent form
of employee ownership in the United States. As noted above in the discussion of broad-based prosperity, there is strong evidence that most
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employee owners receive fixed pay and benefits that are at or above
market level, and that firms do not lower base pay as they adopt ESOPs
except in rare situations, when they may make a concession. Employer
stock generally adds to, rather than substitutes for, other forms of wealth.
This greatly mitigates any financial risk, since workers are not sacrificing for risky pay—the employee ownership may be seen as “gravy” on
top of regular pay, which appears to be crucial in improving employees’
performance-related attitudes and behaviors, as discussed above.
Increased job security reduces financial risk. The biggest form of
financial risk faced by most workers is job loss, as opposed to market
fluctuations in the value of their financial assets. If employee ownership
does contribute to employment stability and firm survival, as suggested
by past studies and as explored in this book, employee owners may face
less financial risk than other employees.
Even risk-averse employees tend to like these plans. One surprising finding from the NBER study of more than 40,000 employees
is that two-thirds of the most risk-averse employees reported that they
would like at least some ownership, profit sharing, or stock options in
their pay package. For example, among those who rated themselves as
3 or lower on a 0–10 scale of how much they like to take risks (with
0 = “hating to take any kind of risk” and 10 = “loving to take risks”),
66 percent said they would prefer to be paid at least in part with profit
sharing, stock, or stock options as opposed to entirely with a fixed wage
or salary. Also, 55 percent of this group wanted their next pay increase
to be split between fixed wages and profit sharing, stock, or options,
and 12 percent wanted it all to be in the form of profit sharing, stock, or
options (Kruse, Blasi, and Park 2010). Risk aversion clearly influences
attitudes toward variable pay, since the above figures were even higher
among those who are less risk averse, but these results indicate that
even risk-averse employees are open to employee ownership and other
variable pay plans.
Along with these empirical findings, researchers find the following:
Recent theory shows that employee ownership can be part of an
efficient diversified portfolio. Harry Markowitz, who won the Nobel
Prize in economics for portfolio theory, explicitly rejects the idea that
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risk aversion precludes employee ownership. His theory concludes that
substantial amounts of a single asset—including stock in one’s company—can be part of an efficient portfolio as long as the overall portfolio is properly diversified (Markowitz, Blasi, and Kruse 2010).
In sum, employee ownership has been seen as relevant to economic
performance, job security, macroeconomic stability, and economic
inequality, with potential implications for firms, workers, the economy,
and society as a whole. Prior studies provide evidence that it is often
associated with better outcomes for firms and workers, and that the free
rider and risk problems are important but may be overcome under the
right circumstances. There is very little evidence, however, on how
employee ownership relates to employment stability and firm survival,
which is the focus of this book. We will spend the latter half of this book
presenting new evidence on the link between employee ownership and
employment stability and firm survival. However, before presenting our
findings, it will be helpful to set the stage by first reviewing the history
and current prevalence of employee ownership, which we turn to now
in Chapter 2.

Notes
1. The Employee Ownership Foundation provided significant funding for the collection of data from the employee ownership module of the GSS.
2. These methods include instrumental variables, two-stage least squares, and Heckman corrections.
3. In one study, only 4 percent of ESOPs were adopted as part of wage and benefit
concessions (USGAO 1986). Of the nearly 1,000 public companies that developed
sizable employee ownership stakes in the 1980s, there were only 26 cases of trading stock for wages and 41 cases of terminating defined benefit plans (Blasi and
Kruse 1991, pp. 325–328).

2
Prevalence of Employee Ownership
This chapter sets the stage for the new evidence presented in the
forthcoming chapters by providing background on the history and
prevalence of employee ownership. In this chapter, we first review the
historical roots of employee ownership in the United States. Employee
ownership as we know it today takes various forms, as discussed in
Chapter 1, such as Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) and
stock ownership in 401(k) pension plans. However, these tools are relatively recent manifestations of the notion of broad-based sharing of
company revenue with employees. The earliest manifestations of the
idea of workers having an ownership stake in the firms where they work
came during the era of the American Revolution, in the closely related
notion of profit sharing.1 Therefore, a discussion of the historical roots
of employee ownership in the United States necessarily involves the
discussion of early implementation of profit sharing. We review the
early history of profit sharing as envisioned by the founding fathers of
the United States and implemented during that time, followed by its
implementation by firms during the era of industrialization. We then go
on to review more recent prevalence of employee ownership using evidence from large data sets—namely, the General Social Survey and the
U.S. Department of Labor Form 5500 files. We also present evidence
on how the prevalence of employee ownership varies by firm industry,
firm size, and worker occupation. Finally, we discuss the prevalence of
employee ownership in countries other than the United States.

HISTORICAL ROOTS OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP IN THE
UNITED STATES
Cod Fisheries and Whaling in New England
The idea of workers having an ownership stake in the firms where
they work has a long and rich history in the United States, and its roots
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can be traced all the way back to the philosophies of the founding
fathers of the republic.
Cod fishing and whaling were among the most important industries
in New England during the early years of the nation. Throughout the
1700s, seamen on cod and whaling ships very commonly had a stake
in the overall profit their ship made. Crews shared the rewards of successful hauls, including the lowest-level members of the crew, and were
called “sharesmen.” Some fishermen even had ownership shares in the
ship, which made them investors in the business as well as recipients of
the profit shares as workers.
George Washington’s Treasury secretary, Alexander Hamilton, was
a proponent of such share schemes and advanced a bill that strengthened
this practice, which Congress passed in 1792 and President Washington
signed into law. The U.S. government wanted to rebuild the cod fishing fleet, which had essentially served as the navy and was decimated
by the British in the Revolutionary War. Building on the sharing tradition in the industry, the law mandated tax credits to cod fisheries,
which would be divided among the vessel’s owners and the crew (threeeighths to the owners and five-eighths to the crew), and the credit would
be granted only if the shipowner had a written contract before the voyage that stipulated that the profit from the entire catch would be shared
with all the sailors. The shipowner could collect the credit only if he
could produce this agreement. The law stayed in force for many years.
In 1803, President Jefferson’s secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin,
reported to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on how the
legislation had helped to strengthen the cod fishing industry. Gallatin
was a strong proponent of broad-based sharing, elsewhere saying that
“the democratic principle upon which this Nation was founded should
not be restricted to the political processes but should be applied to the
industrial operation” (U.S. Senate 1939, p. 72). The cod fishery law
continued well into the nineteenth century. The federal government’s
requirement that the cod fishery tax subsidy law be shared among the
crew is the first documented case in American history where the government made citizen shares a condition for receiving a tax break (Blasi,
Freeman, and Kruse 2013).
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Broad-Based Sharing in the 1800s and Early 1900s
During the late 1800s, the nation’s leading industrialists, such
as Charles Pillsbury, Andrew Carnegie, and John D. Rockefeller,
embraced the notion of employee ownership and profit sharing and
actively implemented broad-based shared capitalism programs in their
companies.2 Many of these companies succeeded in meeting the market
test of surviving in a competitive economy and are still successful to
this day. In 1882, Charles Pillsbury, whose company was the largest
grain miller in the world at the time, instituted one of the first largescale employee profit-sharing schemes in the United States. He firmly
believed that profit sharing was an effective tool to motivate workers,
leading coworkers to be more responsible and practice effective selfmanagement. Early examples also include the personal care company
Procter and Gamble introducing broad-based employee profit sharing
in 1887 and employee ownership some years later, and George Eastman of Eastman Kodak introducing broad-based profit sharing in 1912,
followed by a form of employee ownership similar to stock options. In
order to retain the kind of workers on which Kodak’s rapid innovation
and growth relied, he created what was the first stock option program
in a high-tech corporation in the United States: if workers stayed with
the company, they could keep their company shares, and they could
purchase additional shares for $100 each and cash them in for almost
$600 each.
Current Examples
Today, there are countless examples of extremely successful companies, across all sectors of the U.S. economy, that implement employee
financial participation programs, including many of the nation’s largest
companies, such as General Motors, Exxon Mobil, IBM, Ford Motor
Company, Apple Computers, Microsoft, Intel, Johnson and Johnson,
United Parcel Service, Amazon, Coca-Cola, Cisco Systems, Google,
and Morgan Stanley.
To focus on a few of these examples, the oil and energy company
Exxon Mobil, the United States’s largest corporation, has had broadbased employee ownership plans since John D. Rockefeller established
one of the earliest and most generous employee ownership plans at
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Standard Oil in 1919. General Motors, the country’s fifth-largest corporation, which was bailed out and restructured, has cash profit sharing
and broad-based stock options, while the health plan for its unionized
workers and retirees encompasses a significant chunk of the company’s
stock. Ford Motor Company, the country’s ninth-largest corporation,
has an employee stock ownership plan and a deferred profit-sharing
plan for its salaried and hourly employees, along with cash profit sharing, and the employees own over 13 percent of the company. Johnson
and Johnson, the country’s forty-second-largest corporation, has a long
history of offering employees financial participation in the company as
a result of the writings of Robert Wood Johnson II early in the twentieth
century, and it has a significant employee stock ownership plan.
Broad-based employee financial participation is especially popular
in the technology sector. Microsoft, a leader in software and the Internet, beginning in 1986 pioneered broad-based employee ownership in
the software industry, and it has continually updated these benefits. It
was ranked number 76 on Fortune magazine’s “100 Best Companies to
Work For” list in 2012. Apple Computers, the country’s seventeenthlargest corporation, has a generous employee stock purchase plan that
allows employees to buy up to $25,000 of the stock annually at a 15
percent discount; Apple employees who bought stock for the past seven
years realized a reported 869 percent return on their investment. The
computer chip company Intel, which was one of the pioneers in terms
of offering broad-based employee ownership and having profit sharing
in Silicon Valley, received the Global Equity Organization Award, both
for its financial education of workers and for having the most effective
ownership plan. At Google, all employees are equity holders; the company is about 5 percent owned by its nonexecutive employees and has
reserved almost 5 percent of its shares for future stock and stock-option
grants for its workforce. In 2012, Google won first place in Fortune
magazine’s “100 Best Companies to Work For” list, in part for its commitment to broad-based employee ownership.
The evidence is not limited to these firms. About 10 to 20 percent
of the 4,500 corporations whose stock is traded on the New York Stock
Exchange and the NASDAQ exchange have meaningful employee
ownership. Among the Fortune 100, 21 companies have broad-based
share ownership as part of their business cultures. These include firms in
technology, finance, transportation, energy, retail, and consumer prod-
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ucts. About 10 percent of companies in the Fortune 500 have employee
stock ownership of between 5 and 20 percent. Some have employee
stock purchase plans that allow workers to buy stock at a discount; others have lower-risk employee stock ownership plans that finance the
purchase of stock for workers through loans or company contributions
and grant stock to workers for which the workers do not pay. Sometimes, ESOP stock matches employee contributions to 401(k) plans.
Some plans allow workers to use their wages to buy stock in 401(k)
plans. Others have stock options or plans that grant workers restricted
stock that they receive as long as they stay with the company.
Today, most full or majority employee ownership of a company
is done through an ESOP. Workers receive grants of stock from their
company that they do not have to purchase with savings or wages. Typically, the company sets up a trust that accumulates company stock for
employees through company contributions or loans that the company
takes out to buy the stock. A bank or other lender has to approve the
loan, based on an evaluation of whether the company can pay it back.
Because workers do not pay for the stock with their wages, this form
of employee ownership has lower risk. Most ESOPs are not on stock
exchanges, insulating them from the volatility of stock markets.

CURRENT PREVALENCE OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP IN
THE UNITED STATES
Evidence from the GSS
What is the prevalence of employee ownership in the United States
today? How many workers share in the profits generated by corporations by having an ownership stake in the company where they work?
What proportion of their companies do workers typically own?
It has been difficult to find comprehensive answers to these questions because of the dearth of data pertinent to employee ownership.
National surveys did not include questions on this topic until, in 2002,
a major effort by employee ownership researchers led to the inclusion
of a set of questions on this topic in the General Social Survey (GSS).
As noted in Chapter 1, the GSS, which is conducted by the National
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Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, collects nationally representative data for the United States and therefore allows us to
glean knowledge that is descriptive of the U.S. population as a whole.3
The GSS began including the Topical Module on Shared Capitalism,
with questions on the prevalence of employee ownership, in 2002.
Since then, this module has been included in the GSS every four years:
in 2006, 2010, and 2014.
As part of the Shared Capitalism Module, the GSS asks all workers
if they are eligible for profit sharing (defined as bonuses that are affected
by company performance), and asks private-sector workers about their
ownership of employer stock (either directly or through a pension plan)
and whether they hold stock options. As described in Chapter 1, there
are several ways in which U.S. employees can get an ownership stake in
the companies where they work, including grants to an ESOP, restricted
stock grants, stock matches to employee 401(k) contributions, allocation of employer contributions to stock in deferred profit-sharing and
other pension plans, and employee purchases of stock through 401(k)
plans, employee stock purchase plans (ESPPs), or the open market.
Employees may also acquire an ownership stake in the companies
where they work through stock options, which give them the right to
purchase stock at a predetermined set price (strike price) regardless of
the market price of the stock. So if the market price of the company’s
stock goes above the strike price, the owner of the stock can choose to
exercise the stock option—i.e., exercise her right to buy at the exercise price and immediately sell at the market price, thereby making a
profit. And if the stock price falls below the market price, the owner of
the stock option can hold off on exercising the option so as not to lose
money until the market price rises above the strike price. However, an
important point is that stock-option holdings of employees can only be
considered employee ownership if and when they are exercised. Thus,
stock options could lead to employee ownership, but they do not strictly
constitute employee ownership in and of themselves. Therefore, when
we present descriptive statistics or figures on employee stock-option
holdings, we will treat them as distinct from employee ownership.
Table 2.1 presents evidence on the prevalence of employee ownership in the United States since 2002 from the General Social Survey.
According to the most recent GSS wave, which includes the shared
capitalism module in 2014, 19.5 percent of employees at private-sector
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Table 2.1 Participation in Employee Ownership and Stock Options,
2002–2014
2002
All private sector
% of employees covered
Own company stock
20.1
Hold stock options
12.3
Number of employees covered (millions)
Total employees in economya
109.0
Own company stock
21.9
Hold stock options
13.4
Sample sizes
1,261

2006

2010

2014

17.1
9.1

17.8
9.0

19.5
7.2

114.5
19.6
10.4
1,172

107.7
19.2
9.7
795

117.3
22.9
8.5
885

The figure for total private-sector employees comes from Bureau of Labor Statistics
establishment data for July of the given year.
SOURCE: Based on the authors’ analysis of the General Social Survey (GSS). Data
come from the Shared Capitalism Module of the GSS, administered by the National
Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago.
a

firms in the United States participated in employee ownership through
ownership of company stock, and 7.2 percent participated through ownership of company stock options (column 4). This amounts to 22.9 million employees with stock and 8.5 million with stock options, out of a
total of 117.3 million employees in the private sector.

TRENDS IN THE PREVALENCE OF
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP
Evidence from GSS
How have these figures been evolving during the past decade,
which includes the Great Recession? GSS data on employee ownership
have been collected since 2002, which gives us some idea about the
evolution of employee ownership in the past 15 years. As can be seen in
Table 2.1, the prevalence of employee stock ownership was greatest in
2002, declined in 2006, increased slightly in 2010, and increased again
in 2014. Among all private-sector employees in 2002, one-fifth (20.1
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percent) owned company stock, and that fraction fell to just over onesixth of employees in 2006 (17.1 percent) and 2010 (17.8 percent), but
then rose back to almost one-fifth of employees in 2014 (19.5 percent).
The trend for stock options, however, has been consistently downward,
from 12.3 percent of employees holding stock options in 2002 to 7.2
percent doing so in 2014. This latter trend largely reflects the scaling
back of broad-based stock options after the requirement for expensing
of stock options took effect starting in 2005 (Blasi, Freeman, and Kruse
2013).
Evidence from Pension Reports
We can also glean valuable information about the prevalence and
evolution of employee ownership in the United States from the U.S.
Department of Labor’s Form 5500 firm pension records, which include
all employee ownership held through ESOPs, 401(k) plans, deferred
profit-sharing plans, and other defined contribution plans. As seen in
Table 2.2, based on the Form 5500 data over time, the number of ESOP
participants grew from 7.6 million in 1999 to 10.6 million in 2012,
while the number of participants in 401(k) plans that hold employer
stock declined from 7.3 million to 5.7 million, and the number in
other defined contribution plans that hold employer stock declined
from 0.6 to 0.2 million. The decline in participants in non-ESOP plans
with employer stock reflects the scaling back of employee ownership
through 401(k) plans following the Enron failure, in which workers
used their own savings to overinvest in company stock. The total number of participants, including both ESOPs and non-ESOPs, nonetheless grew over this period from 15.6 million to 16.5 million. Employee
ownership grew not just in number of participants but in coverage of
the private-sector workforce. Using lower-bound estimates that count
only the largest plan in each company (to eliminate any double counting
of employees in more than one plan), the percentage of private-sector
employees in pension plans with employer stock grew from 11.9 percent in 1999 to 14.9 percent in 2006, falling slightly to 14.4 percent in
2010 and 13.6 percent in 2012.
Much of the growth in ESOPs over this period has taken place in
S corporations. In S corporations, corporate income or loss is passed
through to shareholders, who then pay income tax based on those

Table 2.2 Employee Ownership through Pension Plans, 1999–2012
Number of participants
ESOPs
Non-ESOP 401(k) plan with employer stock
Other DC plan with employer stock
Total
Number of employees (lower bound)a
ESOPs
Non-ESOP 401(k) plan with employer stock
Other DC plan with employer stock
Total
% of private-sector workforceb
ESOPs
Non-ESOP 401(k) plan with employer stock
Other DC plan with employer stock
Total

1999

2002

2006

2010

2012

7,653,578
7,332,699
572,582
15,558,859

9,204,622
8,722,121
589,152
18,515,895

9,786,398
8,613,102
265,189
18,664,689

10,289,126
6,418,207
209,788
16,917,121

10,553,875
5,744,207
183,853
16,481,935

6,880,734
6,850,212
433,470
13,104,578

8,529,702
8,349,747
452,121
16,150,879

9,132,348
8,182,402
218,356
17,195,112

9,497,685
6,243,223
184,727
15,599,622

9,855,628
5,637,659
161,753
15,396,508

6.2
6.2
0.4
11.9

7.8
7.7
0.4
14.8

7.9
7.1
0.2
14.9

8.8
5.8
0.2
14.4

8.7
5.0
0.1
13.6

Figures reflect only largest plan within company, eliminating any double counting of participants in more than one plan.
Based on total private employment for December of given year, from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website, bls.gov.
SOURCE: Calculations based on microdata from the U.S. Department of Labor’s (USDOL) Form 5500 pension database.

a

b
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gains or losses (per Subchapter S of Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue
Code). A separate analysis of Form 5500 data finds that the number of
ESOP participants in S corporations more than doubled, from 193,746
to 459,878, over the 2002–2009 period (Brill 2012), which represents
more than half of the total growth in ESOP participants over this period.
This growth occurred despite the fact that retiring owners in S Corporations are not currently eligible to avoid capital gains by selling to
an ESOP (although there is currently a bipartisan bill in Congress to
extend this tax benefit to S corporations).
Table 2.3 focuses on employee ownership in publicly traded U.S.
firms with deferred employee ownership plans, using the core data on
which the empirical analyses in Chapters 3 through 5 are based. The
Table 2.3 Employee Ownership in Pension Plans in Publicly Held
Companies, 1999–2011
1999
Share of firms reporting any EO
16.8
stock in pension plans (%)
Share of workers at firm
13.4
participating in EO in pension
plans, on average (%)
Sample size
9,907

2002
19.9

2005
19.4

2008
18.6

2011
17.9

21.9

17.5

17.2

14.3

8,533

7,804

6,900

5,980

SOURCE: Data are from the USDOL Form 5500 pension database, matched to Standard and Poor’s Compustat data on publicly traded companies in the United States.

percentage of publicly traded firms with deferred employee ownership
plans grew from 16.8 percent in 1999 to 19.9 percent in 2002, then
declined slightly to 19.0 percent in 2006 and 17.5 percent in 2010. Furthermore, the share of workers participating in employee ownership in
pension plans at the typical firm grew from 11.0 percent in 1999 to 14.6
percent in 2002, then declined slightly to 13.6 percent in 2006 and to
12.6 percent in 2010. It is noteworthy that the levels of coverage are
similar between publicly traded companies and the entire private-sector
workforce.
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Does the Prevalence of Employee Ownership at Firms Vary
by Company Characteristics Like Industry, Size, and Worker
Occupation?
Many people think that employee ownership is 1) held mainly by
managerial workers, 2) used mainly in large firms, and 3) concentrated
in the high-tech computer industry. While there is some validity in these
generalizations, they fail to capture the broad prevalence of employee
ownership in the U.S. economy. In fact, employee ownership is prevalent in many different industries and occupations, and it spans firms of
all sizes. We can glean information about the firm size, industry, and
occupation distribution of employee ownership from the GSS.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the share of workers who own stock in their
company within specific industries, using combined data from the 2002,
2006, 2010, and 2014 waves of the GSS. As we can see, there is substantial participation in employee stock ownership among workers in
Figure 2.1 Employee Ownership by Industry
Percentage of employees with employee ownership
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SOURCE: Based on combined data from the 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014 GSS.
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most industries. The communications and information industry has the
highest prevalence of employee ownership, with over 45 percent of
workers in that industry participating in employee ownership of stock.
The finance, insurance, and real estate industry and the transportation
and utilities industry have the next highest prevalence with 31 percent,
closely followed by durable manufacturing with 29 percent and nondurable manufacturing with 28 percent of their workers participating
in employee ownership of stock. Even apart from the leading industries, there is substantial employee ownership of stock across most other
industries: wholesale trade has 17 percent; retail trade has 16 percent;
professional and business services has 14 percent; agriculture, mining,
and construction has 11 percent; and the two lowest industries are education and health services with 8 percent and other services with 7 percent.
Figure 2.2 analogously illustrates the share of workers who own
stock options within industries. We see similar patterns here, though
at lower levels generally. The communications and information indusFigure 2.2 Employees with Stock Options by Industry

Percentage of employees holding stock options
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SOURCE: Based on combined data from the 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014 GSS.
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try is the clear leader with 40 percent of its employees holding stock
options, and the lowest prevalence is among education and health services (2 percent) and other services (3 percent).
We next turn to an analysis of prevalence of employee ownership
within occupations, again using combined data over the 2002–2014
waves. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show that employee stock and stock option
holdings are common across all occupations. As seen in Figure 2.3,
Figure 2.3 Employee Ownership by Occupation

Percentage of employees with employee ownership
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NOTE: Managerial jobs include executives, legislators, administrators, and managers.
Management-related jobs include accountants and auditors, underwriters, financial
officers, management analysts, and personnel and labor specialists. Professional jobs
include architects, engineers, mathematicians and statisticians, scientists, doctors and
dentists, registered nurses, teachers, and lawyers. Technical jobs include laboratory
technicians, dental hygienists, electrical technicians, and mechanical technicians.
Sales jobs include sales workers, advertising sales workers, and cashiers. Clerical
jobs include secretaries, stenographers, typists, administrative support jobs, telephone
operators, and receptionists. Service jobs include firefighters, police, waiters, cleaners, cooks, and child-care workers. Agriculture jobs include farm operators and managers, farm workers, sea captains, and fishers. Blue-collar jobs include mechanics,
equipment repairers, locksmiths, construction supervisors and workers, tailors, bakers, plant and machine operators, and bus and taxi drivers.
SOURCE: Based on combined data from the 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014 GSS.
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management-related occupations and managerial occupations had the
greatest salience of employee stock ownership. Specifically, over 28
percent of workers in management-related occupations (which include
accountants and auditors, financial officers, and management analysts,
among others) had employee stock ownership. This figure was around
26 percent for managerial occupations (executives, managers, etc.),
24 percent for clerical occupations (secretaries, administrative support
jobs, telephone operators, receptionists, etc.), 20 percent for sales occupations (sales workers, cashiers, etc.), and 19 percent for professional
and technical occupations (engineers, architects, doctors, lawyers, laboratory technicians, electrical and mechanical technicians, etc.). Furthermore, blue-collar and agriculture occupations each had 17 percent of
workers who were employee stock owners, and service occupations had
7 percent. Figure 2.4 illustrates stock option holdings within occupations, showing that the greatest concentration of stock option holdings
Figure 2.4 Employees with Stock Options by Occupation
18
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SOURCE: Based on combined data from the 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014 GSS.
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is in management-related occupations (16 percent), followed by clerical
occupations (15 percent) and managerial occupations (13 percent).
Finally, let us turn to an examination of employee ownership by
firm size. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 illustrate that employee stock ownership
is by no means only a large-firm phenomenon. While it is true that large
firms have a greater share of workers who own stock and stock options
in their company, there is substantial ownership at firms of all sizes. As
seen in Figure 2.5, nearly 6 percent of workers owned stock at their firm
in companies that number fewer than 10 employees in size, and 10 percent in companies that have 10–99 employees. This figure was nearly
19 percent at firms with 100–999 employees, nearly 24 percent at firms
with 1,000–9,999 employees, and about 40 percent at firms with more
than 10,000 employees. As for stock option holdings, Figure 2.6 shows
that the share of workers holding stock options in their company was
about 2 percent at firms with fewer than 10 employees, 4 percent at
firms with 10–99 employees, 7 percent at firms with 100–999 employFigure 2.5 Employee Ownership by Size of Firm
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Figure 2.6 Employees with Stock Options by Size of Firm
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ees, 13 percent at firms with 1,000–9,999 employees, and 21 percent at
firms with more than 10,000 employees.
Prevalence of Employee Ownership Abroad
Employee ownership is a common practice not only in the United
States but also abroad. A study of Canadian and Australian firms (Long
and Shields 2005) reports that 21 percent of firms in each of those countries use employee stock purchase plans, and 10 percent of firms in
Canada and 3 percent of firms in Australia use employee stock options.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the European Union encouraged employee
ownership in its four reports from 1991 to 2008 known as the PEPPER (Promotion of Employee Participation in Profits and Enterprise
Results) Reports and called on member states to promote participation by employed persons in profits and enterprise performance. A
2013 study gives an overview of employee ownership in 27 European
Union Countries (Hashi and Hashani 2013). Using data from the Euro-
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pean Company Survey and the European Working Conditions Survey,
the authors show that the average proportion of companies offering
employee share ownership in Europe in 2009 was around 6.5 percent.
This is likely to be an understatement, because these surveys focus on
small and medium-sized firms, and employee ownership tends to be
more prevalent in large firms. The countries with the greatest prevalence of employee ownership are France, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Romania, and the financial sector tends to be the industry with the highest prevalence across countries. Additionally, the proportion of employees involved in employee
ownership has been growing during the 2000s in almost all countries
in the EU. For example, the proportion of employees participating in
employee ownership programs in France grew from around 3 percent
in 2000 to around 7 percent in 2005 and 2010.
Data for the United Kingdom from the Workplace Employment
Relations Survey’s 2004 wave indicate that around 20 percent of British workplaces and 32 percent of British employees had some form
of employee ownership scheme, which is comparable to rates in the
United States (Bryson and Freeman 2010). There are various employee
ownership structures in the United Kingdom that are different from
those in the United States. For example, the United Kingdom has Save
As You Earn (SAYE) Plans, which are all-employee plans that give
workers tax breaks when they save to purchase their employer’s shares
but that do not require that they purchase the shares; Share Incentive
Plans (SIP), which are all-employee schemes that offer tax breaks for
employees holding shares in the company for which they work; and
Company Share Option Plans (CSOPs), in which companies can grant
chosen employees or directors up to 30,000 British pounds of tax- and
national insurance–advantaged share options. The majority of the stock
ownership plans are open to all nonmanagerial employees because the
UK tax code usually requires this as a condition to be able to obtain
tax breaks. The prevalence of share ownership in the United Kingdom
has grown over time, partly reflecting the fact that the UK government
has encouraged broad-based share ownership schemes through favorable tax treatment, especially in the 1980s, when many government tax
incentives were introduced. In that decade, the conservative government
of Margaret Thatcher gave tax advantages for profit-related pay. Since
1997, the more liberal Labour government has given tax advantages
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to share ownership schemes at the expense of profit-related schemes,
which became fully taxable. Unlike the United States, which gives tax
breaks for collective ownership of shares through ESOPs, the United
Kingdom gives breaks for individual share ownership. Pendleton,
Whitfield, and Bryson (2009) show that the proportion of private-sector
UK workplaces with broad-based shared ownership grew from 20 percent in 1984 to 28 percent in 2004.
There is wide variation in the structures and incidence of employee
share ownership in other industrialized countries (Kaarsemaker,
Pendleton, and Poutsma 2010). Among European countries other than
the United Kingdom, France has the highest incidence, with a welldeveloped employee savings system that allows employees to contribute bonuses and savings into employer stock (Fakhfakh, Pérotin, and
Gago 2012). Relatedly, France also has substantial profit sharing as a
result of government tax advantages offered to firms and employees for
participation in profit sharing; one profit-sharing scheme is even compulsory in France for all firms with 50 employees or more (Pérotin and
Robinson 2002). Germany has not traditionally promoted employee
share ownership, and the incidence of employee share ownership is not
as high as in the United States, the United Kingdom, or France, partly
because of the prevalence of very large private companies, in which
ownership is frequently dominated by large—and often hidden—owners. In Western Europe, the countries with the lowest use of employee
share ownership have typically been the Mediterranean countries
(Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), though Spain and Italy have important representation in majority-worker-owned firms and worker cooperatives (Arando et al. 2015).
Russia and Eastern European countries have also had considerable
employee ownership as a result of the transition from Soviet-style economies (Mygind et al. 2006). After an initial surge of interest and policies
promoting employee ownership in Russia following the breakup of the
Soviet Union (Blasi, Kroumova, and Kruse 1997), the Russian economy has returned to concentrated ownership (Kachalina 2013). During the 1990s in Eastern Europe, privatization of many enterprises that
were formerly government owned often involved distributing shares
at discounted prices to employees (Earle and Estrin 1998; Pérotin and
Robinson 2002), and in some cases employees had priority rights to
purchase their firm when it was privatized. Latin American countries
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also have considerable concentrations of employee share ownership
(Burdin 2014).
As described in Chapter 1, employee ownership has been shown
to have positive effects on employee performance, job satisfaction,
morale, and workplace cooperation, among other outcomes. So, one
might ask, why then isn’t employee ownership more prevalent in the
United States as well as globally?4 One possibility is that many firms
are simply not aware of the benefits, which would be understandable,
given that the positive evidence has mostly accumulated only in the
past two decades. An important complementary point is that while the
evidence on economic performance is generally positive, it is also clear
that there is no automatic positive effect of employee ownership, and
many firms with employee ownership do not do well. Without a clear
formula for success, firms will understandably be reluctant to adopt an
organizational innovation like employee ownership, particularly when
there may be significant fixed costs as well as a risk of raising employee
expectations for changes in the way the company will operate and decisions will be made.
Firms will be especially reluctant to provide expanded ownership to
employees if doing so dilutes the ownership stakes of existing owners—
the dilution will need to be counteracted by improved performance, if
existing owners are to have an incentive to distribute ownership more
broadly. Existing owners may also be concerned about spreading financial information about the firm more broadly, since such information
could fall into the hands of competitors. Finally, employee ownership
may not be appropriate for all firms and workers, particularly those in
volatile industries. Nevertheless, the growth in employee ownership in
many countries indicates that the potential benefits may be increasingly
recognized and may outweigh the barriers mentioned above.
Apart from reluctance by firms to adopt employee ownership,
unions have often been opposed to employee ownership, in part because
of the concern that it will complicate collective bargaining by blurring
the line between workers and owners. Unions have also been concerned
about financial risks to workers from variable pay and wealth, and about
management’s willingness to provide transparent, accurate information
about the financial status of the company. Some unions, however, have
taken initiatives to pursue employee ownership for workers out of a
belief that this can improve workers’ economic status, job security, and
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role in workplace governance.5 The positive effects of employee ownership and other shared rewards on employee attitudes and behaviors
appear to be just as strong among union workers as among nonunion
workers (McCarthy et al. 2011).
In sum, there has been a substantial amount of experimentation with
employee ownership around the globe in the past several decades. This
chapter has also demonstrated that broad-based employee ownership
is prevalent not just in a handful of firms, sectors, or occupations, but
is an economy-wide phenomenon in the United States and has a long
and rich history, with roots in the philosophies of America’s founding
fathers. Given this background, we are now ready to present in the next
three chapters our results on the role played by employee ownership in
employment stability and firm survival in the United States during the
decade encompassing the Great Recession.

Notes
1. Indeed, the value of a firm’s stock represents the present discounted value of its
profits. Therefore, by owning firm stock, an employee has a claim to a share of
those profits.
2. This section draws on material presented in Blasi, Freeman, and Kruse (2013).
3. The GSS is based on face-to-face interviews of randomly selected adults in their
homes. Face-to-face interviews are generally superior to mail surveys, computerassisted surveys, and telephone surveys in terms of accuracy. Moreover, the
interviewer can ask more detailed questions than is possible under other survey
methods, and the respondent can refer to personal records to answer questions
more precisely. While response rates have been declining for telephone and mail
surveys in recent years, the General Social Survey gets responses from more than
70 percent of the people who are asked to participate in the survey, which is very
high in comparison to other surveys.
4. For a discussion of the specific barriers facing worker cooperatives, see Olsen
(2013).
5. For a further description of the arguments and literature on this topic, and new
evidence on the effects of employee ownership, profit sharing, and stock options
for union workers, see McCarthy et al. (2011).

3
How Does Employee Ownership
Affect Employment Stability?
Understanding the determinants of employment stability during
economic downturns is a topic of keen interest to academic researchers, government policymakers, and firms. In this chapter, we examine
whether broad-based employee ownership affects employment stability
within firms.
As described in Chapter 2, the prevalence of employee ownership
has been growing over the past several decades in the United States and
other advanced economies. According to the 2014 wave of the General Social Survey (GSS), 19.5 percent of U.S. workers own company
stock, and 7.2 percent own company stock options. And according to
data from the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) Form 5500 firm
pension records, between 1999 and 2010 the share of publicly traded
U.S. firms with employee ownership plans grew from 16.8 percent to
17.5 percent, and the share of workers participating in employee ownership at the typical such firm rose from 11.0 percent to 12.6 percent,
on average. Given the increasing prevalence of employee ownership,
along with the high economic and social costs that can accompany job
loss, understanding the relationship between employee ownership and
employment stability carries great policy significance.
Data from the GSS indicate that employee ownership and employment stability are positively correlated. As was shown in Chapter 1,
involuntary layoffs and turnover intentions are lower among workers
who are employee owners. Moreover, between 2006 and 2010, while
the figures for EO workers remained relatively stable, layoffs and
turnover intentions at non-EO firms grew. Put differently, layoffs and
turnover became more likely among non-EO workers than among EO
workers following the Great Recession. At the same time, job satisfaction was higher among EO workers than among non-EO workers.
In this chapter, we conduct an in-depth empirical analysis of how
firms with employee ownership programs weathered the recessions of
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2001–2003 and 2008–2010 in terms of employment stability relative
to firms without employee ownership programs, and also of whether
such firms were less likely to lay off workers when faced with negative
shocks more broadly. In our econometric analyses, we use a rich array
of measures of employee ownership at firms, including
• the presence of employee ownership stock in pension plans,
• the presence of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs),
• the value of employee ownership stock per employee,
• the share of the firm owned by employees,
• the share of workers at the firm participating in employee ownership, and
• the share of workers at the firm participating in ESOPs.
We also consider both economy-wide negative shock measures
(increases in the unemployment rate, declines in the employment-topopulation ratio) and firm-specific negative shock measures (declines
in firm sales, declines in firm stock price).
The firm data that we use to examine the relationship between
employee ownership and employment stability come from Standard
and Poor’s Industrial Compustat database on publicly traded companies, matched to Form 5500 pension data collected by the USDOL,
which contain detailed information on employee ownership in ESOPs
and other defined contribution pension plans. These are administrative data for the population of publicly traded firms. This represents an
improvement over data sets based on samples that are generally drawn
from special surveys suffering from small sample sizes and bias from
self-selection of respondents.1 A further advantage is that we are able
to follow firms over time, which allows us to use panel methods in
our econometric analyses to help control for unobserved firm-specific
effects. Our findings show strong evidence that employee ownership
firms are less likely to reduce employment in the face of economy-wide
and firm-specific negative shocks.
This examination constitutes an important contribution to the
research on employee ownership and has important implications for
government policymakers and employers. It presents large-scale empirical evidence on the role of employee ownership in employment stability during recessions. It also underscores the importance of government
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policy that encourages employee ownership as a policy tool to curb
unemployment during recessions.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Why would we expect firms with employee ownership programs to
exhibit greater employment security during economic downturns?
Firms often introduce employee ownership programs as a means of
building a long-term cooperative employment relationship with their
employees, and a lower incidence of layoffs can be a means of maintaining the credibility of the firm’s commitment to that relationship.
Employee ownership firms may provide greater employment security as
part of an overall effort to build a more cooperative workplace culture
and a sense of psychological ownership (Pierce, Rubenfeld, and Morgan
1991). This cooperative culture can increase worker effort, as well as
create a general willingness on the part of workers to make adjustments
during times of economic distress, both of which can increase firm productivity and lower the firm’s need to lay off workers during downturns.
Employee ownership can also increase firm revenues, as employees
may be more willing to share technical information with management,
which can increase production efficiency. Indeed, numerous empirical
studies have linked employee ownership to increased productivity and
other performance measures, as was reviewed in Chapter 1.
Apart from any effects that workplace culture may have on productivity, employee ownership may help to instill a sense of psychological ownership, which firms maintain in part through a commitment
to preserve employee jobs. Such a workplace culture could increase
employee willingness to invest in valuable firm-specific skills.
There may be a stabilizing effect of employee ownership if it
increases the flexibility of compensation, although this is likely to
occur only under special circumstances. While firms may contribute
less company stock to employees during hard times, this flexibility is
no different from what happens in other defined contribution pension
plans in which the company contribution may vary year to year. Extra
flexibility due to employee ownership would occur only if 1) employer
stock substitutes for wages or other benefits and 2) the returns from
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employer stock (dividends and share price increase) are seen as part
of employee compensation. When these conditions hold and negative
demand shocks occur, the decrease in company stock value provides an
automatic “pay cut” for workers, and the lower fixed component of pay
(due to substitution of employee ownership for fixed pay) means that
firms will have less incentive to lay off workers.2

PAST STUDIES ON EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP AND
EMPLOYMENT STABILITY
A number of past empirical studies examined related issues, and
one of the goals of the current study is to update some of these earlier
findings and understand how employee ownership firms weathered the
recessions of the 2000s.
Pencavel and Craig (1992, 1994) studied the plywood worker cooperatives (companies in which 100 percent, or almost 100 percent, of
the company’s stock is held by its workers) in the U.S. Pacific Northwest and found that cooperatives kept employment stable but, instead,
adjusted wages in response to a negative product price over the analysis
window of 1968–1986. These results seem to be achieved without compromising efficiency, since productivity levels were 6–14 percent higher
among the plywood cooperatives compared to conventional companies
(Craig et al. 1995). Pencavel, Pistaferri, and Schivardi (2006) examined employment and wages at worker-owned and conventional enterprises in Italy using a matched employer-worker panel for 1982–1994
and, similarly, found that worker-owned firms had lower wages and
more variable wages than conventional firms but also had less volatile employment. Numerous other studies using panel data on worker
cooperatives from various countries in Europe and South America have
found analogous results (Burdin and Dean 2009; Jones et al. 2013).
Blair, Kruse, and Blasi (2002) tracked U.S. public companies with
broad-based employee ownership plans holding more than 17 percent
of company stock over 1983–1995 and compared them to otherwisesimilar firms in the same industries. They found that employee ownership was associated with greater employment stability, which did not
come at the expense of firm efficiency, given that the stock market per-
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formance of the employee ownership firms was slightly better than that
of other firms. Similarly, studies have found employee ownership to
be associated with greater employment stability in a broader sample
of U.S. public companies from 1988 to 2001 (Park, Kruse, and Sesil
2004), and in a sample of U.S. closely held companies from 1988 to
1999 (Blasi, Kruse, and Weltmann 2013).
There is some evidence suggesting that employees may exert formal or informal pressures to increase job security in employee ownership firms. For example, a majority of Americans say that if they owned
company stock and an outside investor was attempting a takeover, they
would not sell, even for twice the market value of the stock (Kruse
and Blasi [1999], citing a 1994 EBRI/Gallup poll). This appears to be
due to concerns that an outside investor would lay off workers (Kruse,
Freeman, and Blasi 2010).

DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The firm data for this project were drawn from two sources: 1)
Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat database on publicly traded
companies and 2) the Form 5500 pension plan data collected by the
USDOL. The Compustat data comprise information on firm characteristics including total employment and financial information, while
the Form 5500 pension plan data set contains detailed information on
employee ownership in ESOPs and other defined contribution pension
plans. We matched firm records from the Compustat data and Form
5500 data using each firm’s unique IRS Employer Identification Number for the 13 years spanning 1999–2011, resulting in the firm-year
panel data set on which all of our analyses are based.
Our data set is composed of the full population of publicly traded
companies in the United States. As noted earlier, this data set provides
an advantage over data sets drawn from special surveys suffering from
small sample sizes and self-selection of respondents. It also allows us
to conduct longitudinal analyses in order to help control for unobserved
firm-specific effects. Furthermore, the data span a decade when the
United States experienced two recessions, in 2001 and 2008, allowing
us to examine how employee ownership firms weathered these eco-
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nomic downturns relative to nonemployee ownership companies. We
also have an array of measures of employee ownership at companies,
including the presence of employee ownership through pension programs and ESOPs, and the extent of such employee ownership in terms
of total participation and share of the firm owned by workers.
Our goal is to understand whether firms with employee ownership
programs exhibit greater employment stability in the face of economic
downturns. We examine six different measures of employee ownership
within firms in our empirical analyses in particular:
1. Any employee ownership: whether a firm reported any employee ownership stock in any of its defined contribution pension plans,
including employee ownership in 401(k) plans, ESOPs, and deferred
profit-sharing plans in a given year.3
2. ESOP: whether a firm reported having an ESOP plan in a given
year.
3. Employee ownership stock value per employee at the firm:
total employee-owned stock value in dollars, divided by total number of
employees (including nonowners) at a firm in a given year.4
4. Percentage of company owned by employees: the share of the
firm owned by employees in a given year.
5. Employee owners as a percentage of employees: the share of
all employees participating in employee ownership at a firm in a given
year.
6. ESOP participants as a percentage of employees: the share of
all employees participating in ESOPs at a firm in a given year.
To understand how firms with employee ownership programs
respond to economic downturns, we first consider a fairly broad proxy
of economic conditions—namely, the unemployment rate. Figure 3.1
illustrates trends in the national unemployment rate during 1999–2011.
The recessions starting in 2001 and 2008 are clearly seen in this figure
as sustained increases in the unemployment rate (from 3.97 percent in
2000 up to 5.99 percent in 2003, and from 4.62 percent in 2007 up to
9.63 percent in 2010).
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Figure 3.1 Average Unemployment Rate, 1999–2011
12

10

Percentage

8

6

4

2

0
1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

SOURCE: Based on labor force statistics from the Current Population Survey seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for ages 16 and older.

As a first step in understanding how firms with employee ownership
vary their employment with changes in the unemployment rate, we plot
in Figure 3.2 the average yearly percentage change in employment over
2000–2010 at firms with and without any employee ownership in their
defined contribution plans. As the figure clearly illustrates, employment
was more stable at firms with employee ownership than at firms without during 2000–2010: employment declines were smaller at employee
ownership firms during years when overall employment shrunk across
firms; employment increases were also smaller at employee ownership
firms during years with overall employment growth across all firms.
This trend is also evident in Panels B and C of Figure 3.2, which illustrate yearly percentage change in employment at firms with and without ESOPs, and at firms with and without at least 5 percent of the firm
owned by employees. Note that the threshold of 5 percent meets the
Security and Exchange Commission’s definition of a major stakeholder.
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Figure 3.2 Average Yearly Percentage Change in Employment by
Employee Ownership, 2000–2010
Panel A: Percentage change in employment by “Any employee ownership” (firm
reported any EO stock)
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Panel B: Average yearly percentage change in employment by ESOP status
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Figure 3.2 (continued)
Panel C: Average yearly percentage change in employment for companies with greater
than 5 percent employee ownership and companies with less than 5 percent
employee ownership
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SOURCE: Based on authors’ calculations from the USDOL Form 5500 pension database.

Although Figure 3.2 illustrates the basic story, we would like to
know whether the positive relationship between employment stability
and employee ownership holds when we control for firm characteristics.
We therefore estimate standard regressions, estimating the relationship
between the yearly percentage change in employment at firms and each
of our six measures of employee ownership when the firm faces negative demand shocks. We use two economy-wide measures of demand
shocks—1) unemployment rate and 2) employment-to-population ratio.
Changes in the employment-to-population rate may serve as a better
measure of economic downturn than the unemployment rate, because
the latter counts individuals who are not working but seeking employment, which is often difficult to measure accurately. We also examine
employment stability in the face of two types of firm-level negative
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shocks: 1) decline in firm sales since the previous year and 2) decline in
firm stock price since the previous year.
In our regressions we control for firm characteristics, including capital stock growth (to control for mergers and divestitures), union status (to control for union-influenced employment stability), interactions
between demand shocks and average firm size (to control for differential response between larger and smaller firms), industry and industryspecific trends, and firm fixed effects (to control for time-invariant firm
characteristics).5 In our regressions, we focus on employee ownership
as of the prior year so that we can be more sure that the employee ownership was a plausible cause rather than effect of the demand shocks.
While our basic method controls for any general differences among
firms in their employment growth or decline (through the fixed effects),
it is nonetheless possible that the responsiveness to demand shocks
may vary among firms in a way that affects our estimates. For example, some firms may have developed methods of avoiding layoffs when
negative demand shocks occur, and these firms may be more likely to
adopt employee ownership. In this case the employee ownership would
be more of a symptom than a cause of reduced layoffs. We can test this
possibility by analyzing firms that switched employee ownership status
within the period, through either adopting or dropping employee ownership, and comparing their response to negative demand shocks when
they do and do not have employee ownership. To implement this test,
for each of the demand shocks we identify companies in our sample that
experienced at least one negative shock with, and one negative shock
without, employee ownership.6 While this sample is limited, it allows
us to explore whether the same firm appears to act differently when it
does and does not have employee ownership.
To streamline the exposition of results, we have summary tables with
key findings representing the estimated implied percentage changes in
firm employment in response to each of the types of demand shocks.
These summaries are based on regressions presented in the appendix.
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Table 3.1 depicts descriptive statistics by presence of employee
ownership programs, and it illustrates, among other results, that EO
firms were on average larger, grew more slowly than non-EO firms,
were more likely to be unionized as indicated by a union pension plan,
and were more likely to be in the transportation and finance industries,
while less likely to be in the service industry, than non-EO firms. These
differences by employee ownership status indicate the importance of
controlling for these characteristics in our estimates, since stability may
be influenced by firm size, union status, and industry trends. Within the
employee ownership firms, the average dollar value of employee ownership stock per employee was $10,540, the share of the firm owned by
employees was 3.3 percent, and the share of workers at the firm participating in employee ownership was 72 percent.
The extent of employee ownership within firms is explored in more
detail in Table 3.2. There is considerable variation in employee ownership assets per employee, with a “low” value (twenty-fifth percentile) of
$949, a “high” value (seventy-fifth percentile) of $12,967, and a “very
high” value (ninety-fifth percentile) of $44,414. (Note that these are
averages across all employees in the firm, not just those owning stock.)
Since these are publicly held companies, most of the stock is held by
outside shareholders. Employees typically own just a small percentage
of these companies, with a median of 1.5 percent and a ninety-fifth percentile of 11.9 percent, indicating that in only 5 percent of the EO companies do employees own about one-eighth or more of the company.
There is less variation in the employee coverage measures, for which
Table 3.2 shows that employee owners are four-fifths (80.2 percent)
of all employees in the median EO firm, and ESOP participants are
three-fourths (74.6 percent) of all employees in the median ESOP firm.
This broad coverage is not surprising, given that our employee ownership measure is based on Form 5500 data for pension plans, which are
required to be broad-based to qualify for tax deductibility.
Table 3.3 summarizes the results from the regressions examining
the percentage change in within-firm employment in response to negative shocks (based on the full regression estimates reported in Tables
3A.1 through 3A.4). The first column summarizes the results from the

Sales ($ millions)
Sales change (natural logarithm)
Sales change if increase
Sales change if decrease
Stock price change (%)
Stock price change if increase
Stock price change if decrease
Capital stock change (natural logarithm)
Union pension plan
Agriculture, forestry, fishing
Mining
Construction
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics on Public Company Sample
Any employee ownership
Mean
Std. dev.
Obs.
Employee size
14,128
60,808
18,620
Employment change (natural logarithm)
0.012
0.213
16,814
ESOP
0.350
0.477
18,620
EO assets per employee ($)
10,540
16,195
18,429
EO as % of firm ownership
0.033
0.056
17,395
Employee owners as % of all employees
0.721
0.283
18,620
ESOP participants as % of all employees
0.229
0.366
18,620

No employee ownership
Mean
Std. dev.
Obs.
4,185
20,544
67,276
0.025
0.347
55,987
0.000
0.000
67,276
0.000
0.000
67,276
0.000
0.000
59,092
0.000
0.000
67,276
0.000
0.000
67,276

4,186
0.056
0.160
−0.164
−0.040
0.333
−0.450
0.055
0.210

16,416
0.252
0.182
0.237
0.573
0.332
0.508
0.443
0.408

18,611
16,743
11,372
5,371
16,333
8,635
7,664
13,639
18,620

1,181
0.091
0.289
−0.279
−0.128
0.491
0.682
0.078
0.055

6,057
0.460
0.373
0.371
0.842
0.517
0.680
1.265
0.228

67,071
53,050
34,566
18,440
50,983
23,926
26,758
48,790
67,276

0.004
0.034
0.011

0.060
0.181
0.104

18,620
18,620
18,620

0.003
0.043
0.009

0.054
0.203
0.092

67,276
67,276
67,276

Manufacturing
Transportation, communications, and utilities
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Finance, insurance, and real estate
Service
Public administration

0.372
0.112
0.029
0.070
0.251
0.114
0.003

0.483
0.315
0.168
0.255
0.434
0.318
0.056

18,620
18,620
18,620
18,620
18,620
18,620
18,620

0.375
0.092
0.031
0.050
0.187
0.196
0.015

0.484
0.289
0.172
0.217
0.390
0.397
0.122

67,276
67,276
67,276
67,276
67,276
67,276
67,276

SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly
traded companies in the United States.
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Table 3.2 Amounts of Employee Ownership within Employee
Ownership Firms

EO assets per
employeea ($)
EO as % of firm
ownership
Employee owners
as % of all
employees
ESOP participants
as % of all
employees

Low
Median
High Very high
Number of
(25th
(50th
(75th
(95th
firm-year
percentile) percentile) percentile) percentile) Average observations
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
949
3,937
12,967
44,414
10,540
18,429
0.5

1.5

3.9

11.9

3.3

17,395

52.5

80.2

100.0

100.0

72.4

18,539

47.6

74.6

96.9

100.0

68.8

7,515

NOTE: Restricted to years in which firm had positive values of employee ownership.
EO = employee ownership.
a
Calculated across all employees in company, not just participants in employee ownership plan.
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard
and Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly traded companies in the United
States.

specification in which the negative shock measure we use is increased
unemployment rate, the second column uses decreased employmentto-population ratio, the third column uses decreased firm sales, and the
final column uses decreased stock price.
Unemployment Rate
Our first set of results, presented in column 1 of Table 3.3, indicates
support for our hypothesis that employee ownership firms reduce their
employment by a smaller percentage when faced with a negative shock
compared to firms without employee ownership.
When the unemployment rate increases by 1.0 percent, firms without
employee ownership in any of their defined contribution plans decrease
employment by 3.0 percent, while firms with any employee ownership
in their defined contribution plans decrease employment by only 2.8
percent, and firms with any ESOPs decrease employment by only 1.7
percent. The second of these differences is strong enough to reject ran-
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Table 3.3 Summary of Overall Relationship between Employee
Ownership and Employment Stability

Negative
shock:
No employee ownership
Any employee ownership
Any ESOP
Average EO assets per employee ($)
Zero
Mean (10,540)
Low (947)
Median (3,937)
High (12,967)
Very high (44,414)
By % of company owned by employees
Zero
Mean (3.3)
Low (0.5)
Median (1.5)
High (3.9)
Very high (11.9)
By % of workers in EO
Zero
Mean (72.4)
Low (52.5)
Median (80.2)
High (100)
By % of workers in ESOP
Zero
Mean (68.8)
Low (47.6)
Median (74.7)
High (96.9)
Very high (100)

% change in company employment in
response to negative demand shocks
Economy
Unemploy- employFirm stock
ment rate ment rate Firm sales price down
up 1%
down 1% down 10%
10%
−3.0
−4.2
−4.0
−0.7
−1.0
−2.8
−3.9
−4.0
−1.7
−2.7
−3.2
−1.0
−3.0
−2.1
−2.9
−2.7
−2.0
0.6

−4.2
−3.1
−4.1
−3.8
−2.8
0.4

−3.8
−2.9
−3.7
−3.4
−2.7
−0.3

−0.7
−0.5
−0.7
−0.6
−0.5
0.1

−3.0
−2.9
−3.0
−2.9
−2.9
−2.6

−4.2
−4.1
−4.2
−4.1
−4.0
−3.7

−3.7
−3.8
−3.7
−3.8
−3.8
−4.1

−0.7
−0.7
−0.7
−0.7
−0.7
−0.9

−3.0
−2.3
−2.5
−2.3
−2.1

−4.2
−3.3
−3.6
−3.2
−3.0

−3.6
−3.3
−3.4
−3.3
−3.2

−0.7
−0.8
−0.8
−0.8
−0.9

−3.0
−1.4
−1.9
−1.3
−0.8
−0.7

−4.1
−2.2
−2.8
−2.0
−1.4
−1.3

−3.7
−2.2
−2.6
−2.0
−1.6
−1.5

−0.7
−0.5
−0.6
−0.5
−0.4
−0.4

NOTE: Based on regression results reported in Appendix Tables 3A.1 to 3A.4. Figures
in bold are based on statistically significant employee ownership × negative shock
interactions (at the 95% level).
SOURCE: Data from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard and
Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly traded companies in the United States.
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dom sampling error as an explanation. We see a statistically stronger
relationship when we turn our attention to the value of employee ownership stock per employee at the firm: when the unemployment rate
increases by 1 percent, firms where the value of employee ownership
assets per worker is low (where “low” is defined as being at the twentyfifth percentile of the distribution) decrease their employment by 2.9
percent, in contrast to firms where the value of employee ownership
is at the median (fiftieth percentile), high (seventy-fifth percentile), or
very high (ninety-fifth percentile) levels, at which employment declines
by only 2.7 percent, 2.0 percent, and 0.6 percent, respectively. Employment declines are only statistically weakly related to the percentage of
the firm owned by employees, but they are statistically strongly related
to employee coverage: when the unemployment rate increases by 1
percent, firms where the share of workers in employee ownership is
zero, low, at the median, and high experience an employment decrease
of 3.0 percent, 2.5 percent, 2.3 percent, and 2.1 percent, respectively.
Likewise, firms in which the share of workers in ESOPs is zero, low,
at the median, high, and very high experience an employment decrease
of 3.0 percent, 1.9 percent, 1.3 percent, 0.8 percent, and 0.7 percent,
respectively.
Employment-to-Population Ratio
As mentioned before, changes in the employment-to-population
rate serve as a better measure of economic downturn than the unemployment rate because the latter considers individuals who are not
working but are seeking employment, which can be difficult to measure
accurately. Therefore, we also estimate all our regressions treating as
our indicator of economic downturn a decline in the annual employment-to-population rate rather than an increase in the annual unemployment rate. Figure 3.3 illustrates the trajectory of the employment-topopulation rate over the period 1999–2011.
The results summarized in column 2 of Table 3.3, using the employment-to-population ratio, show strong evidence that EO firms provide
greater employment security than non-EO firms during economic
downturns.
Firms with no employee ownership experience a 4.2 percent
employment decline when the employment-to-population rate goes
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Figure 3.3 Average Employment-to-Population Rate, 1999–2001
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down by 1.0 percent, in contrast to firms with employee ownership,
in which employment decreases by only 3.9 percent, and firms with
ESOPs, in which employment decreases by 2.7 percent. Once again,
only the second difference is strong enough to reject sampling error.
Firms with zero, low, median, and high EO assets per employee reduce
employment by 4.2 percent, 4.1 percent, 3.8 percent, and 2.8 percent,
respectively (while the estimate for very high EO assets per employee
is actually a 0.4 percent increase in employment). Again, the pattern
is favorable but statistically weak when examining share of the company owned by workers, while it is favorable and statistically strong
when examining employee coverage in any EO or in ESOPs. When
the employment-to-population ratio goes down by 1.0 percent, firms
with zero, low, median, and high shares of employees who are owners reduce their employment by 4.2 percent, 3.6 percent, 3.2 percent,
and 3.0 percent, respectively, and firms with zero, low, median, high,
and very high shares of workers in ESOPs reduce their employment
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by 4.1 percent, 2.8 percent, 2.0 percent, 1.4 percent, and 1.3 percent,
respectively.
Decline in Firm Sales
We next examine employment stability in the face of firm-level
negative shocks using two specific measures: 1) decline in firm sales
since the previous year and 2) decline in firm stock price since the previous year. Column 3 of Table 3.3 summarizes our regression findings
on the extent to which firms with EO programs exhibit smaller employment declines when they experience a 10 percent decrease in their sales.
Here we find fewer statistically strong relationships with EO measures
than when we use the economy-wide measures of demand shocks.
The strongest findings occur with respect to two areas: 1) EO assets
per employee and 2) percentage of workers in an ESOP. A 10 percent
decrease in sales is linked to a 3.3 percent decline in employment when
EO assets per employee are zero. When these assets are at their low,
median, high, and very high values, the employment declines are 3.3
percent, 3.0 percent, 2.3 percent, and 0.1 percent, respectively. Similarly, as the share of employees who are ESOP participants increases,
the employment decline drops from 3.3 percent when no workers are
covered to 1.1 percent when all workers are covered.
Decline in Firm Stock Price
As with the sales measure, the stock price measure provides fewer
strong relationships between EO and employment declines than do the
economy-wide measures. The one measure showing a favorable relationship is EO assets per employee: when a firm’s stock price declines
by 10 percent, firms with zero EO assets per employee have an employment decline of 0.7 percent. This employment decline is reduced to 0.6
percent and 0.5 percent at the median and high levels of EO assets per
employee and essentially disappears at the very high level. There is a
puzzling but small positive relationship between employment declines
and the percentage of the company owned by employees, indicating
that the employment decline is 0.7 percent at low levels but 0.9 percent
at very high levels of percentage of company owned. A caution on this
result, however, is that it appears to be sensitive to the specification, and
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the result disappears when we add prior employment change or take
out the interactions between firm size and demand shocks as predictors. (Also, the results for other measures become more favorable to the
stabilizing effect of EO, but here we present the results from the base
specification for the sake of consistency.)

PROBING ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS
There are a variety of ways in which the regressions testing for
employment stability can be specified. Our investigation of a number of
alternative specifications produced the same general pattern of results.7
One key issue is causality: does employee ownership lead to stability,
or do more stable firms adopt employee ownership? This can be examined in part by examining the responses of the same firms before and
after they adopt or drop employee ownership. Since we are focused on
the effects of negative demand shocks, we break out companies (called
“EO switchers”) that experienced at least one negative demand shock
with employee ownership and one without employee ownership. If
employee ownership firms are simply more stable to begin with (before
adopting employee ownership), there should be no difference in their
EO and non-EO years, while there should be a difference if employee
ownership plays a plausible role in employment stability.
A total of 391 firms met our criteria to be EO switchers for the
economy-wide measures (that is, they experienced at least one recession year with employee ownership and one without employee ownership), while for the firm-specific measures of sales and stock price, 376
and 536 firms, respectively, met our criteria as EO switchers. While
these are not large samples and there may be other unobserved factors
at work, these firms can nonetheless shed light on the role of employee
ownership in stability.
Table 3.4 summarizes the results from studying these switchers
(based on fuller results presented in Appendix Tables 3A.5–3A.8).
As shown in column 1, when they did not have employee ownership,
their average response to an increase in the unemployment rate was a
2.1 percent decline in employment, while having average EO assets
per employee is linked to only a 1.4 percent decline and having the
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Table 3.4 Summary of Changes in Employment Stability for Employee
Ownership Switchers

Negative shock
Response of non-EO firms
Responses of EO switchers
during time that they had:
No employee ownership
Any employee ownership
ESOP
Mean of EO assets/employee
Mean of % of company owned
by employees
Mean of % of workers in EO
Mean of % of workers in ESOP

% change in company employment in
response to negative demand shocks
Economy
Unemploy- employment
Firm stock
ment rate up rate down Firm sales price down
1%
1%
down 10%
10%
−3.1
−4.3
−3.3
−0.7

−2.1
−2.7
−1.6
−1.4
−2.8

−3.1
−3.9
−2.3
−2.6
−3.8

−3.5
−3.4
−2.6
−2.5
−3.6

−0.6
−1.0
−0.8
−0.6
−0.9

−2.5
−1.3

−3.5
−2.2

−3.3
−1.5

−1.0
−0.7

NOTE: “Switchers” = firms that adopted or dropped employee ownership and had
negative demand shocks during periods both with and without employee ownership.
Based on regression results reported in Appendix Tables 3A.5–3A.8. Figures in bold
are based on statistically significant employee ownership × negative shock × switcher
interactions (at the 95% level).
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard
and Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly traded companies in the United
States.

mean percentage of workers in an ESOP is linked to only a 1.3 percent
decline. These two EO measures show similar results when the negative
demand shock is measured as a decrease in the employment/population
ratio (column 2) or a 10 percent decrease in firm sales (column 3). The
results for other EO measures in columns 1–3 are mixed, but none are
strong enough to reject sampling error. In addition, none of the results
for stock price in column 4 showed increased stability as firms switched
to employee ownership, while three replicate the puzzling result noted
in Table 3.3 of employee ownership being linked to greater employment
responses to stock price declines. One potential difficulty with the stock
price measure is that it reflects investor evaluations of future profitability, and as such it is sensitive to firm news such as increased layoffs. So
it may be that the stock price decrease is a response to announcements
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of employment cutbacks rather than an exogenous predictor of declines
in demand for the firm’s products.
Therefore, the analysis of EO switchers points to possible changes
in employment behavior as firms adopt employee ownership, particularly with regard to the measures of EO assets per employee and percentage of workers in an ESOP.
We further probed the results in three ways. First, we used the lagged
change in logarithm of employment as a control, to address possible
correlations between unobserved variables and the lagged dependent
variable as identified by Arellano and Bond (1991). The results using
the Arellano-Bond correction were actually slightly more favorable to
the stabilizing effect of employee ownership than the results we present
here. Second, we omitted change in capital stock as a control variable,
since that is potentially endogenous with respect to determination of
the employment level. This omission, however, made no noteworthy
difference in our results of interest. Third, we omitted the interactions
between firm size and the demand shocks, which made no difference in
the estimates using the economy-wide demand shocks but weakened
the results using the sales measure. We believe it is appropriate to control for these interactions since employee ownership firms are larger on
average (as shown in Table 3.1), and larger firms have larger proportional responses to sales decreases (as shown in Appendix Table 3A.3).
Overall, we find that results from these additional tests are broadly consistent with the results presented here.

CONCLUSION
Using data matched between USDOL Form 5500 and the Industrial Compustat database on all publicly traded U.S. companies during
1999–2011, this chapter has shown that firms with employee ownership are linked to greater employment stability in the face of an economic downturn when measured as macroeconomic negative shocks
(increases in the unemployment rate, decreases in the employmentto-population ratio) as well as firm-specific negative shocks (declines
in firm sales). The size of the effects varies by employee ownership
measure, with favorable results most consistently found for average EO
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assets per employee, employee owners as a percentage of all employees, and ESOP participants as a percentage of all employees. While we
have only limited data to examine changes in employment behavior as
firms adopt or drop employee ownership, our tests point to increased
stability for firms that switch employee ownership status when they
have high EO assets per employee or a high percentage of employees
covered by an ESOP.
These findings highlight the role that employee ownership may
play in stabilizing employment, particularly during recessions. They
also underscore the importance of government policy that encourages
employee ownership as a policy tool to curb unemployment during
recessions, as we will discuss in the final chapter.

Notes
1. Our data do not contain firms with employee ownership that are not publicly
traded, either because they are privately held or because they are completely
employee owned.
2. This dynamic would be similar to the theorized effect of profit sharing on employment stability proposed by Weitzman (1984), since the short-run marginal cost of
labor would be lower than the marginal revenue product of labor, leading firms to
retain workers.
3. Note that this measure understates employee ownership in pension plans because
it does not include employee ownership in master trusts or collective trusts that
combine assets of several plans.
4. Note that this will be understated when employee ownership stock is held in master trusts or collective trusts that combine assets of several plans.
5. Specifically, we estimate the following ordinary least squares specification, which
illustrates the magnitude of employment changes in response to changes in the
unemployment rate at EO firms as compared to non-EO firms:
LNEMPCHit = β0 + β1 NegDit + β2PosDit + β3 NegDit × EOit−1 + β4
PosDit × EOit−1 + β5 × NegDit × Avgempi + β6PosDit × Avgempi +
where

Xit + θi + εit ,

LNEMPCHit = ln(employment) at firm i in year t −ln(employment) at firm i in year
t − 1, winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles to reduce the influence of
extreme values.
EOit−1 = employee ownership variable at firm i in year t − 1, alternatively measured as 1) dummy for any employee ownership, 2) dummy for ESOP, 3) average
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employee-owned stock per employee in dollars (across all employees, not just
participants), 4) proportion of company owned by employees, 5) employee owners as proportion of all employees, and 6) ESOP participants as proportion of all
employees.
NegDit = Negative demand shock from t − 1 to t, alternatively measured as
1) percentage-point increase in the U.S. unemployment rate, 2) percentage-point
decrease in the U.S. employment/population ratio, 3) decrease in firm ln(sales), and
4) percentage decrease in firm stock price. This variable takes the value 0 if there
was no negative demand shock.
PosDit = Positive demand shock from t − 1 to t, alternatively measured as
1) percentage-point decrease in unemployment rate, 2) percentage-point increase
in employment/population ratio, 3) increase in ln(sales), and 4) percentage
increase in stock price. This variable takes the value 0 if there was no positive
demand shock.
Avgempi = Mean of ln(employment) within firm across all reported years.
Xit = vector of firm controls for firm i in year t, including capital stock growth,
presence of collectively bargained pension plan, industry dummies, and linear and
quadratic industry-specific time trends (Industry i × t and Industry i × t2).
θi = firm fixed effects.
Our hypothesis is that β1 < 0 and β3 > 0—i.e., employment will decline by a smaller
percentage at EO firms than at non-EO firms in response to negative demand
shocks (with the decrease in employment being β3 percent smaller in magnitude at
EO firms than at non-EO firms).
We exclude the EOit − 1 main effect since 1) any general differences in employment changes between EO and non-EO firms will be captured by the firm fixed
effects and 2) the responsiveness of firms to demand shocks may be affected by
their changes in employment growth associated with EO, so that an EO main
effect would partly capture the stabilizing effect we are trying to estimate. We
nonetheless include EO main effects in supplementary regressions and obtained
similar results.
To probe the robustness of results, we use year dummies in place of the time
trends, with similar results for the coefficient estimates on the interaction between
the demand shock and employee ownership.
6. The estimating equation for this specification is:
LNEMPCHit = β0 + β1 NegDit + β2 PosDit + β3 NegDit × EOswitcheri
+ β4 × PosDit × EOswitcheri + β5 NegDit × EOswitcheri × EOit−1
+ β6 PosDit × EOswitcheri × EOit−1
+ β7 × NegDit × EOnonswitcheri × EOit−1
+ β8 PosDit × EOnonswitcheri × EOit−1 + β9 × NegDit × Avgempi
+ β10PosDit × Avgempi + Xit + θi + εit ,
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where
EOswitcheri = Firm i had at least one negative demand shock with, and one without, employee ownership.
EOnonswitcheri = Firm i had employee ownership but did not meet the standard
for EOswitcheri. All other variables as defined in previous note.
β1+ β3 + β9(Avgempi) measures the response to negative demand shocks for switchers when they do not have employee ownership, and β5 measures any change in
response to negative demand shocks when switchers have employee ownership.
7. A sample of these results is available in our working paper Kurtulus and Kruse
(2016).
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Negative demand shock: UR increase
Positive demand shock: UR decrease
Negative shock interacted with:
Any EO

−0.029***
(0.002)
0.065***
(0.006)

−0.030***
(0.001)
0.060***
(0.005)

−0.02994***
(0.00137)
0.05711***
(0.00533)

0.00081***
(0.00010)

EO % of company

0.037
(0.036)

EO share of employees

0.009***
(0.003)

ESOP share of employees

EO assets per employee

−0.030***
(0.001)
0.059***
(0.005)

0.014***
(0.003)

EO assets per employee

ESOP

−0.030***
(0.001)
0.059***
(0.006)

0.002
(0.002)

ESOP

Positive demand shock interacted with:
Any EO

−0.030***
(0.001)
0.061***
(0.006)
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Table 3A.1 Employment Responses to General Demand Shocks: Unemployment Rate

0.023***
(0.004)
−0.024**
(0.009)
−0.002
(0.012)
0.00121***
(0.00036)

EO % of company

−0.184*
(0.104)

EO share of employees

0.001
(0.012)

ESOP share of employees
Negative demand shock × average firm
ln(employment)
Positive demand shock × average firm
ln(employment)
Firm and industry controls
Firm fixed effects
Observations
R-squared
Number of firms

0.001
(0.001)
−0.011***
(0.003)
Yes
Yes
61,241
0.125
8,356

0.001
(0.001)
−0.012***
(0.003)
Yes
Yes
61,241
0.125
8,356

0.00070
(0.00071)
−0.01271***
(0.00276)
Yes
Yes
61,120
0.12478
8,355

0.001
(0.001)
−0.012***
(0.003)
Yes
Yes
54,915
0.123
7,752

0.001
(0.001)
−0.012***
(0.003)
Yes
Yes
61,241
0.125
8,356

0.005
(0.015)
0.001
(0.001)
−0.012***
(0.003)
Yes
Yes
61,241
0.125
8,356

NOTE: The dependent variable = ln(employment change, winsorized). UR = unemployment rate. Fixed effects (within) regressions.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Firm
and industry controls include collective bargaining status, change in capital stock, and industry trend and trend squared.
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly
traded companies in the United States.
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Negative demand shock: E/Pop decrease
Positive demand shock: E/Pop increase
Negative shock interacted with:
Any EO

−0.040***
(0.002)
0.122***
(0.011)

−0.041***
(0.002)
0.109***
(0.010)

−0.04165***
(0.00163)
0.10306***
(0.00952)

0.00102***
(0.00013)

EO % of company

0.044
(0.042)

EO share of employees

0.012***
(0.004)

ESOP share of employees

EO assets per employee

−0.041***
(0.002)
0.107***
(0.010)

0.015***
(0.004)

EO assets per employee

ESOP

−0.042***
(0.002)
0.110***
(0.010)

0.003
(0.003)

ESOP

Positive demand shock interacted with:
Any EO

−0.042***
(0.002)
0.106***
(0.010)
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Table 3A.2 Employment Responses to General Demand Shocks: Employment/Population Ratio

0.028***
(0.005)
−0.064***
(0.017)
−0.032
(0.020)
0.00129**
(0.00064)

EO % of company

−0.580***
(0.184)

EO share of employees

−0.026
(0.022)

ESOP share of employees
Negative demand shock × average firm
ln(employment)
Positive demand shock × average firm
ln(employment)

Firm and industry controls
Firm fixed effects

0.002**
(0.001)
−0.010**

0.001
(0.001)
−0.013***

0.00156*
(0.00086)
−0.01479***

0.001
(0.001)
−0.014***

0.001*
(0.001)
−0.013***

−0.027
(0.028)
0.001
(0.001)
−0.014***

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.00479)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.005)

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Observations
61,241
61,241
61,120
54,915
61,241
61,241
0.125
0.125
0.12547
0.123
0.125
0.125
R-squared
Number of firms
8,356
8,356
8,355
7,752
8,356
8,356
NOTE: The dependent variable = ln(employment change, winsorized). Fixed effects (within) regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Firm and industry controls include
collective bargaining status, change in capital stock, and industry trend and trend squared.
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly
traded companies in the United States.
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Negative shock interacted with:
Any EO
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Table 3A.3 Employment Responses to Firm-Specific Demand Shocks: Sales Changes
Negative demand shock: sales decrease
−0.357*** −0.362*** −0.37486*** −0.371***
(0.017)
(0.016)
(0.01554)
(0.017)
Positive demand shock: sales increase
0.374***
0.366***
0.36387*** 0.382***
(0.012)
(0.011)
(0.01094)
(0.012)

−0.364***
(0.017)
0.368***
(0.011)

−0.365***
(0.015)
0.364***
(0.011)

0.004
(0.031)

ESOP

0.081*
(0.043)

EO assets per employee

0.00781***
(0.00127)

EO percent of company

−0.285
(0.420)

EO share of employees

0.048
(0.037)

ESOP share of employees

0.217***

(0.048)
Positive demand shock interacted with:
Any EO

ESOP
EO assets per employee

−0.059***
(0.022)
−0.024
(0.040)
−0.00023
(0.00088)

EO % of company

−0.322
(0.372)

EO share of employees

−0.032
(0.028)

ESOP share of employees
Negative demand shock × average firm
ln(employment)
Positive demand shock × average firm
ln(employment)
Firm and industry controls
Firm fixed effects
Observations
R-squared
Number of firms

−0.047***

−0.049***

−0.05168***

−0.050***

−0.049***

0.014
(0.052)
−0.049***

(0.006)
0.055***

(0.005)
0.053***

(0.00533)
0.05286***

(0.006)
0.059***

(0.005)
0.054***

(0.005)
0.053***

(0.004)
Yes
Yes

(0.004)
Yes
Yes

(0.00408)
Yes
Yes

(0.004)
Yes
Yes

(0.004)
Yes
Yes

(0.004)
Yes
Yes

58,553
0.224
8,126

58,553
0.224
8,126

58,442
0.22455
8,125

52,435
0.222
7,524

58,553
0.224
8,126

58,553
0.224
8,126

NOTE: The dependent variable = ln(employment change, winsorized). Demand shocks measured as change in ln(sales), winsorized. Fixed
effects (within) regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; ***
significant at the 0.01 level. Firm and industry controls include collective bargaining status, change in capital stock, and industry trend
and trend squared.
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly
traded companies in the United States.
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Negative demand shock: stock price decrease
Positive demand shock: stock price increase
Negative shock interacted with:
Any EO

−0.061***
(0.004)
0.007
(0.005)

−0.067***
(0.004)
0.002
(0.004)

−0.07030***
(0.00369)
−0.00212
(0.00407)

0.00171***
(0.00063)

EO % of company

−0.149***
(0.045)

EO share of employees

−0.021*
(0.011)

ESOP share of employees

EO assets per employee

−0.069***
(0.004)
0.000
(0.004)

−0.022*
(0.012)

EO assets per employee

ESOP

−0.065***
(0.004)
0.003
(0.005)

−0.032***
(0.008)

ESOP

Positive demand shock interacted with:
Any EO

−0.068***
(0.004)
0.003
(0.004)
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Table 3A.4 Employment Responses to Firm-Specific Demand Shocks: Stock Price Changes

0.008
(0.015)
−0.032***
(0.010)
−0.016
(0.013)
0.00358***
(0.00108)

EO % of company

−0.142
(0.107)

EO share of employees

−0.016
(0.013)

ESOP share of employees
Negative demand shock × average firm
ln(employment)
Positive demand shock × average firm
ln(employment)
Firm and industry controls
Firm fixed effects
Observations
R-squared
Number of firms

0.015***

0.014***

0.01333***

0.014***

0.014***

0.017
(0.019)
0.014***

(0.002)
−0.003

(0.002)
−0.005**

(0.00172)
−0.00554***

(0.002)
−0.005**

(0.002)
−0.004**

(0.002)
−0.005**

(0.002)
Yes
Yes
56,389
0.134
7,807

(0.002)
Yes
Yes
56,389
0.134
7,807

(0.00205)
Yes
Yes
56,283
0.13424
7,806

(0.002)
Yes
Yes
54,907
0.134
7,751

(0.002)
Yes
Yes
56,389
0.134
7,807

(0.002)
Yes
Yes
56,389
0.134
7,807

NOTE: The dependent variable = ln(employment change, winsorized). Demand shocks measured as change in ln(stock price), winsorized.
Fixed effects (within) regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level;
*** significant at the 0.01 level. Firm and industry controls include collective bargaining status, change in capital stock, and industry
trend and trend squared.
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly
traded companies in the United States.
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UR increase
UR increase × (EO switcher)
UR increase × (EO switcher) ×
Any EO

−0.030***
(0.002)
0.010*
(0.005)

−0.030***
(0.001)
0.005
(0.004)

−0.030***
(0.001)
0.006
(0.004)

−0.083
(0.071)

EO assets per employee

0.001***
(0.000)

EO share of employees

−0.003
(0.008)

ESOP share of employees

EO % of company

−0.030***
(0.001)
0.005
(0.004)

0.010
(0.006)

EO % of company

ESOP

−0.031***
(0.002)
0.009*
(0.005)

−0.006
(0.006)

ESOP

UR increase × (EO nonswitcher) ×
Any EO

−0.030***
(0.001)
0.006
(0.004)
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Table 3A.5 Employment Ownership Switchers and General Demand Shocks: Unemployment Rate

0.018**
(0.007)
0.004
(0.003)
0.015***
(0.004)
0.054
(0.037)

EO assets per employee
EO share of employees

0.001***
(0.000)
0.013***
(0.004)

ESOP share of employees

0.027***
(0.005)
Firm controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
61,241
61,241
60,000
61,120
61,241
61,241
0.125
0.125
0.124
0.125
0.125
0.125
R-squared
Number of firms
8,356
8,356
8,281
8,355
8,356
8,356
Number of EO switchers
391
391
391
391
391
391
Number of EO nonswitchers
1,444
1,444
1,444
1,444
1,444
1,444
NOTE: The dependent variable = ln(employment change, winsorized). “EO switcher” = company had at least 1 EO and 1 non-EO observation in years when stock price declined. “EO nonswitcher” = other EO companies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant
at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Control variables include collective bargaining status;
change in capital stock; industry trends and trend squared; unemployment increase and its interaction with the EO switcher, the EO
switcher times each EO measure, and the EO nonswitcher; and average ln(employment) interacted with unemployment increases and
decreases.
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly
traded companies in the United States.
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E/pop decrease
E/pop decrease × (EO switcher)
E/pop decrease × (EO switcher) ×
Any EO

−0.042***
(0.002)
0.012**
(0.006)

−0.042***
(0.002)
0.006
(0.005)

−0.041***
(0.002)
0.006
(0.005)

−0.069
(0.088)

EO assets per employee

0.001***
(0.000)

EO share of employees

−0.005
(0.009)

ESOP share of employees

EO % of company

−0.042***
(0.002)
0.006
(0.005)

0.014*
(0.007)

EO % of company

ESOP

−0.043***
(0.002)
0.012**
(0.006)

−0.008
(0.007)

ESOP

E/pop decrease × (EO nonswitcher) ×
Any EO

−0.042***
(0.002)
0.006
(0.005)

0.022**
(0.009)
0.005
(0.003)
0.017***
(0.004)
0.059
(0.043)
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Table 3A.6 Employment Ownership Switchers and General Demand Shocks: Employment/Population Ratio

EO assets per employee

0.001***
(0.000)

EO share of employees

0.016***
(0.004)

ESOP share of employees
Firm controls
Firm fixed effects
Observations
R-squared
Number of firms
Number of EO switchers
Number of EO nonswitchers

Yes
Yes
61,241
0.125
8,356
391
1,444

Yes
Yes
61,241
0.125
8,356
391
1,444

Yes
Yes
60,000
0.125
8,281
391
1,444

Yes
Yes
61,120
0.125
8,355
391
1,444

Yes
Yes
61,241
0.125
8,356
391
1,444

0.033***
(0.006)
Yes
Yes
61,241
0.126
8,356
391
1,444

NOTE: The dependent variable = ln(employment change, winsorized). E/pop = employment/population ratio. “EO switcher” = company
had at least 1 EO and 1 non-EO observation in years when stock price declined. “EO nonswitcher” = other EO companies. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Control
variables include collective bargaining status; change in capital stock; industry trends and trend squared; E/pop decrease and its interaction with the EO switcher, the EO switcher times each EO measure, and the EO nonswitcher; and average ln(employment) interacted
with E/pop increases and decreases.
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly
traded companies in the United States.
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Sales decrease
Sales decrease × (EO switcher)
Sales decrease × (EO switcher) ×
Any EO

−0.346***
(0.017)
−0.024
(0.052)

−0.351***
(0.015)
−0.017
(0.047)

−0.347***
(0.015)
−0.027
(0.047)

0.418
(1.012)

EO assets per employee

0.009***
(0.002)

EO share of employees

0.023
(0.081)

ESOP share of employees

EO % of company

−0.354***
(0.015)
−0.023
(0.046)

0.080
(0.091)

EO % of company

ESOP

−0.353***
(0.016)
−0.017
(0.053)

0.017
(0.063)

ESOP

Sales decrease × (EO nonswitcher) ×
Any EO

−0.362***
(0.015)
−0.040
(0.042)

0.289***
(0.080)
−0.006
(0.032)
0.066
(0.050)
−0.717*
(0.410)
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Table 3A.7 Comparing Employment Responses among Employee Ownership Switchers across Sales Decreases

EO assets per employee

0.007***
(0.001)

EO share of employees

0.047
(0.038)

ESOP share of employees
Firm controls
Firm fixed effects
Observations
R-squared
Number of firms
Number of EO switchers
Number of EO nonswitchers

Yes
Yes
58,553
0.222
8,126
376
1,475

Yes
Yes
58,553
0.222
8,126
376
1,475

Yes
Yes
57,327
0.223
8,052
376
1,475

Yes
Yes
58,442
0.223
8,125
376
1,475

Yes
Yes
58,553
0.222
8,126
376
1,475

0.193***
(0.058)
Yes
Yes
58,553
0.223
8,126
376
1,475

NOTE: The dependent variable = ln(employment change, winsorized). “EO switcher” = company had at least 1 EO and 1 non-EO observation in years when stock price declined. “EO nonswitcher” = other EO companies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant
at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Control variables include collective bargaining status;
change in capital stock; industry trends and trend squared; sales increase and its interaction with the EO switcher, the EO switcher times
each EO measure, and the EO nonswitcher; and average ln(employment) interacted with sales increases and decreases.
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly
traded companies in the United States.
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Stock price decrease
Stock price decrease × (EO switcher)
Stock price decrease × (EO switcher) ×
Any EO

−0.060***
(0.004)
0.006
(0.013)

−0.062***
(0.004)
−0.012
(0.010)

−0.063***
(0.004)
−0.011
(0.010)

−0.145***
(0.042)

EO assets per employee

0.002
(0.002)

EO share of employees

−0.040**
(0.019)

ESOP share of employees

EO % of company

−0.064***
(0.004)
−0.012
(0.010)

−0.003
(0.017)

EO % of company

ESOP

−0.064***
(0.004)
0.003
(0.012)

−0.038***
(0.014)

ESOP

Stock price decrease × (EO nonswitcher) ×
Any EO

−0.065***
(0.004)
−0.013
(0.010)
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Table 3A.8 Employee Ownership Switchers and Firm-Specific Demand Shocks: Stock Price Decreases

0.016
(0.023)
−0.020**
(0.010)
−0.040**
(0.016)
−0.124
(0.100)

EO assets per employee

0.001***
(0.001)

EO share of employees

−0.002
(0.013)

ESOP share of employees
Firm controls
Firm fixed effects
Observations
R-squared
Number of firms
Number of EO switchers
Number of EO nonswitchers

Yes
Yes
53,867
0.112
7,585
536
1,247

Yes
Yes
53,867
0.112
7,585
536
1,247

Yes
Yes
53,377
0.112
7,577
536
1,247

Yes
Yes
53,771
0.112
7,584
536
1,247

Yes
Yes
53,867
0.112
7,585
536
1,247

−0.004
(0.018)
Yes
Yes
53,867
0.112
7,585
536
1,247

NOTE: The dependent variable = ln(employment change, winsorized). “EO switcher” = company had at least 1 EO and 1 non-EO observation in years when stock price declined. “EO nonswitcher” = other EO companies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant
at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Control variables include collective bargaining status;
change in capital stock; industry trends and trend squared; stock price increase and its interaction with the EO switcher, the EO switcher
times each EO measure, and the EO nonswitcher; and average ln(employment) interacted with sales increases and decreases.
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly
traded companies in the United States.

87

4
Do Employee Ownership Firms
Survive Recessions
Better than Other Firms?
In this chapter, we turn our attention to the relationship between
employee ownership and firm survival. Firm survival is an important
outcome variable to examine, as it is generally an indicator of success for a company, increases job security for workers employed, and
thereby benefits the economy more broadly by reducing unemployment
and economic hardship. It therefore also constitutes an important component of any comprehensive analysis of employment stability.
What are the channels through which employee ownership may
enhance firm survival? There are five possible channels:
As discussed in Chapter 2, previous research has shown employee
ownership to be linked to increased firm and worker productivity through
greater employee cooperation, commitment, and information sharing at
the workplace. Despite the free-rider problem associated with groupbased pay, studies have generally found employee ownership to be linked
to higher performance (Doucouliagos 1995; Kaarsemaker 2006; Kruse
and Blasi 1997; O’Boyle, Patel, and Gonzalez-Mulé, forthcoming).
1) Prior research has shown that employee ownership policies
tend to be implemented along with other complementary
high-performance workplace practices, such as employee
involvement in decision making, team production, and on-thejob training, to create a more engaged workplace, which can
also contribute to improved survival outcomes in the face of
financial distress (Becker and Huselid 1998; Blasi et al. 2010;
DeVaro and Kurtulus 2010; Ichniowski et al. 1996; Ichniowski,
Shaw, and Prennushi 1997; Kurtulus, Kruse, and Blasi 2011).1
2) Employee ownership can reduce workplace conflict, which can
contribute to production frictions and firm failure (Cramton,
Mehran, and Tracy 2008).
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3) Employee ownership tends to foster long-term employment
relationships, which in turn encourage both employers and
employees to make higher investments in firm-specific skills
and facilitate increased productivity and survival prospects
(Levine and Parkin 1994).
4) Employee ownership may increase employee willingness to
suggest and participate in innovations that enhance long-term
firm performance and prospects (Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi
2010).
On the other hand, employee ownership may negatively impact firm
survival if it contributes to increased communication friction among
employees or otherwise creates conflicts or inefficiencies within firms
that can lead to a higher rate of failure. There may be especially strong
potential for conflict and collective action problems when employees
have heterogeneous preferences, such as may occur when there are
substantial shares of employees in different occupations or divisions of
a firm (Hansmann 1996). For example, if employees in each division
favor increased investment in their own division, there may be complicated political conflicts in deciding where investment will occur. This
concern primarily applies to cases where employees have strong roles
in corporate governance, unlike the situation in most U.S. employee
ownership companies.
For our examination of the link between employee ownership and
firm survival, we use data on the entire universe of publicly traded
U.S. companies as of 1999, following them through 2010. We use
the same data set as in Chapter 3, based on merging two sources:
1) federal Form 5500 data, which is collected by the U.S. Department
of Labor (USDOL) and provides information on employee participation in employee ownership through pension plans, and 2) Standard and
Poor’s Compustat data, which provide information on firm closures,
mergers, acquisitions, and liquidations, as well as firm financial data.
We estimate Cox hazard regressions predicting the probability of firm
dissolution as a function of a wide array of measures of employee ownership and firm controls.2
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PAST STUDIES ON EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP AND
FIRM SURVIVAL
Previous research on the relationship between employee ownership
and firm survival is limited. Research on U.S. data shows that firms
with employee ownership have higher survival rates. Blair, Kruse, and
Blasi (2002) find that firms with 5 percent or more employee ownership stakes in 1983 were 20 percent more likely than closely matched
industry pairs to survive through 1995. Park, Kruse, and Sesil (2004)
examined publicly traded companies in the United States between 1998
and 2001 using hazard regression methods. They find that the firms in
which employees owned 5 percent or more of the firm’s stock were 21
percent more likely to survive through 2001. Welbourne and Cyr (1999)
show that among companies with initial public offerings in 1988, those
with broad-based ownership had higher rates of survival and stockprice growth.
The most recent study closest to ours is that of Blasi, Kruse, and
Weltmann (2013), which uses a sample of closely held companies
(without any publicly traded stock) from Dun and Bradstreet, in which
ESOP companies were matched to non-ESOP companies in the same
industry over the 1988–1999 period. This study finds that closely held
ESOP companies in 1988 were only half as likely as non-ESOP firms to
go bankrupt or close over the 1988–1999 period, and only three-fifths
as likely to disappear for any reason. ESOP companies had significantly
higher postadoption annual employment and sales growth, along with
higher sales per employee. They were also four times more likely than
their non-ESOP pairs to have defined benefit pension plans and other
forms of defined contribution plans, which along with other data on
the above-market compensation levels of most ESOPs indicates that
greater survival does not come from lower labor costs.
Evidence from outside the United States focuses on worker cooperatives. Burdin (2014) finds that worker cooperatives in Uruguay exhibited death rates that were 29 percent lower than conventional firms.
Pérotin (1987) finds that a shorter supply of capital funds is associated
with future closure of cooperatives, while the business cycle appears to
have similar effects on the failure rate of cooperatives and conventional
firms. The pattern of risk for new firms, however, is found to be dif-
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ferent: new cooperatives have a honeymoon period when commitment
is high and risk of closure is lower than that for conventional firms,
although risks increase later on (Pérotin 1997).
The Mondragon system of cooperatives in Spain also deserves
mention here. The Mondragon Corporation is the largest worker cooperative in the world; it consists of a federation of worker cooperatives in
the Basque region of Spain. While there have not been studies focused
on survival of individual cooperatives in Mondragon, the survival and
growth of the overall system since the 1950s is consistent with the
idea that employee ownership can promote survival. The survival of
the Mondragon system is undoubtedly enhanced by a supportive infrastructure that includes a university providing graduates and technical
assistance to the cooperatives, and a bank providing financial capital
and assistance with financial planning.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY
As described in Chapter 3, we compiled the data set by merging
Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat database on publicy traded
firms and the Form 5500 pension plan data collected by the U.S. Department of Labor for the years 1999–2010. The Compustat database provides information on firm characteristics like total employment, industry, financial information, and reason for firm failure, while the Form
5500 pension plan database contains detailed information on employee
ownership in defined contribution plans and employee stock option
plans (ESOPs). We matched firm records from the Compustat data and
Form 5500 data, using each firm’s unique IRS employer identification
number.
Also as described in Chapter 3, our data set is made up of the full
sample of publicly traded companies in the United States, which is an
important improvement over data sets drawn from special surveys suffering from small sample sizes and bias from self-selection of respondents. A further advantage is the 12-year span of our data set, covering
a decade when the United States experienced two recessions, in 2001
and 2008; this allows us to examine how employee ownership firms
weathered these economic downturns relative to nonemployee owner-
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ship companies. We also have a rich array of measures of employee
ownership at companies, including the presence of employee ownership
through pension programs and ESOPs, and the extent of such employee
ownership in terms of total participation and the share of the firm owned
by workers. One limitation is that firm disappearance is uncommon in
general, especially among firms that have gone public. While we have
enough disappearances to enable meaningful analysis, the low likelihood of disappearance makes it more difficult to establish significant
differences, which makes any significant differences we do find all the
more noteworthy. It should also be noted that our results are based on
the universe of publicly traded companies over this time period, but that
they might not fully generalize to closely held companies, which are
generally smaller and have a different industrial distribution.
We estimate Cox proportional hazards regressions to predict the
likelihood of firm failure.3 The main independent variable of interest in
our hazard models is the employee ownership variable. Our hypothesis
is that the relative hazard ratio for this variable should be between zero
and one, indicating a lower “hazard” or likelihood of failure for EO
firms than non-EO firms, on average. The regressions also include firm
controls, including firm size, union status, and industry.
We first estimate regressions in which we treat any disappearance
of a firm from the Compustat database as a firm failure. However, companies may disappear as independent entities when they merge or are
acquired by another company, and this can actually signal success in
some cases, as other firms want to acquire or merge with successful
companies. Compustat provides reasons for deletion of firms that no
longer appear in that database, including acquisition, merger, bankruptcy, and liquidation. We therefore also estimate models in which
firm failure is defined strictly as bankruptcy or liquidation.
As in the analysis of employment stability, we consider six different measures of employee ownership in our empirical analyses: 1) any
employee ownership, 2) presence of an ESOP, 3) employee ownership stock per employee, 4) employee ownership—percentage owned,
5) employee owners as a percentage of employees, and 6) ESOP participants as a percentage of employees.
Table 4.1 shows average probabilities of firm disappearance by
presence of employee ownership in the pooled analysis sample, and it
illustrates that firms with employee ownership programs are less likely
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Table 4.1 Firm Disappearance by Presence of Employee Ownership

Disappeared for any reason
Disappeared because of
bankruptcy or liquidation
Disappeared for any reason
Disappeared because of
bankruptcy or liquidation

Disappeared for any reason
Disappeared because of
bankruptcy or liquidation

Mean (%)
Obs.
Any employee ownership
5.2
17,981
0.2
17,981
Have ESOP
4.9
8,027
0.2
8,027
EO% of company
owned > 5%
4.9
3,342
0.2
3,342

Mean (%)
Obs.
No employee ownership
7.6
77,874
0.4
77,874

7.4
0.4

No ESOP
87,828
87,828

EO% of company
owned < 5%
7.2
92,513
0.4
92,513

NOTE: “Disappeared for any reason” = dummy variable equaling 1 if firm i in year t
dropped out of the data set for any reason (including bankruptcy, merger/acquisition,
liquidation, reverse acquisition, no longer publicly traded, no longer files with SEC);
0 otherwise. “Disappeared because of bankruptcy or liquidation” = dummy variable
equaling 1 if firm i in year t went bankrupt or was liquidated; 0 otherwise.
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database, matched to Standard and
Poor’s Compustat data on publicly traded companies in the United States, 1999–2011.

to disappear for any reason and also less likely to disappear because
of bankruptcy or liquidation. The likelihood of disappearance for any
reason in a given year is 5.2 percent for firms with any employee ownership and 7.6 percent for firms with no employee ownership, while
the likelihood of disappearance due to bankruptcy or liquidation is 0.2
percent for firms with any employee ownership and 0.4 percent for
firms with no employee ownership. These differences are similar when
we compare firms with more than 5 percent of the company owned by
employees and those with less than 5 percent employee ownership.
Figure 4.1 illustrates failure rates through 2010 among firms that
were observed and either had or did not have employee ownership in
1999.4 The two lines in each panel represent the share of 1999 firms
that disappeared in each ensuing year, by presence of any employee
ownership in 1999.5 As seen in Panel A, the share of firms that disappeared was lower among firms that had employee ownership in 1999
than among those that did not have employee ownership, until the year
2005, after which the shares were nearly the same. This pattern is simi-
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Figure 4.1 Failure Rates of 1999 Firms by Employee Ownership
Panel A: Failure rates by presence of any employee ownership in 1999
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NOTE: Tracks the share of 1,664 firms with “any employee ownership” and 8,242 firms
with “no employee ownership,” as observed in 1999, that were no longer observed in
ensuing years.
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database, matched to Standard
and Poor’s Compustat data on publicly traded companies in the United States, 1999–
2010.

lar in Panel B for firms with and without ESOPs and in Panel C for
firms where the share of the firm owned by employees is above and
below 5 percent.

REGRESSION RESULTS
In Table 4.2, we summarize the hazard ratios from Cox proportional
hazard regressions predicting the likelihood of firm disappearance
(based on more detailed regression results in Appendix Table 4A.1).
For each EO measure, we report the hazard ratios both from the model
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Figure 4.1 (continued)
Panel B: Failure rates by ESOP status in 1999
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NOTE: Tracks the share of 645 firms with “any ESOPs” and 9,262 firms with “no
ESOPs,” as observed in 1999, that were no longer observed in ensuing years.

where we treat any disappearance of a firm from the data as a firm failure (column 1) and from the model where we define firm failure strictly
as bankruptcy or liquidation (column 2).
Column 1 of Table 4.2 provides strong evidence that EO firms are
less likely to disappear than non-EO firms, and the results are statistically significant for all the employee ownership variables in our analysis. As seen in the first entry in column 1, the relative hazard ratio associated with any EO is 0.786 and significant, meaning that EO firms were
only 78.6 percent as likely as non-EO companies to disappear in any
year over the 1999–2010 period. Second, firms with ESOPs were 82.1
percent as likely as non-ESOP firms to disappear in any year. Third,
the value of EO stock per worker was associated with a higher survival
probability: an extra $1,000 of employee ownership stock was linked
to a 0.5 percent lower risk of disappearing. This means that, since the
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Figure 4.1 (continued)
Panel C: Failure rates by EO greater than or less than 5 percent of firm
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NOTE: Tracks the share of 366 firms with EO percentage of company owned >5% and
9,542 firms with EO percentage of company owned <5%, as observed in 1999, that
were no longer observed in ensuing years.

mean value of employee ownership stock among employee owners
was $10,613, average employee ownership was linked to a 5.307 percent lower risk of disappearing in any given year. Fourth, the share of
the firm owned by employees had a big impact on firm survival: firms
where the share of the firm owned by employees was 5 percent or more
were only 77.2 percent as likely to disappear as firms with less than a
5 percent share of employee ownership. Finally, the share of workers
participating in employee ownership and ESOPs was also negatively
related to the likelihood that a firm would disappear: specifically, an
increase in the share of the firm’s employee owners from 0 percent to
100 percent was associated with a 22.4 percent lower risk of disappearing in any given year, and an increase in ESOP participants at the firm
from 0 percent to 100 percent was linked to a 24.4 percent lower risk.

98 Kurtulus and Kruse
Table 4.2 Summary of the Relationship between Employee Ownership
and Firm Survival from Cox Proportional Hazard Regressions
Predicting Firm Survival over the Period 1999–2010
Dependent variable
Disappeared
because of
Disappeared
bankruptcy
for any reason or liquidation
0.786
Any EO
0.928
0.821
ESOP
0.900
0.987
0.776
EO stock per worker
0.772
EO percentage of company owned >5%
0.813
0.776
Employee owners as % of all employees
0.800
0.756
ESOP participants as % of all employees
0.512
NOTE: Each cell contains the estimated hazard rate from a Cox Proportional Hazard
Regression predicting the likelihood of firm death for each EO variable in turn. Full
regression results are reported in appendix tables. Each regression controls for firm
size, union status, and industry. Bold figures indicate that the hazard estimate is statistically significantly lower than 1.00 (p < 0.05).

Turning to column 2 of Table 4.2, using the more stringent firm
failure measure of bankruptcy or liquidation, we see that EO firms were
less likely than non-EO firms to experience bankruptcy or liquidation
in any given year over the 1999–2010 period; however, most of the
hazard rates do not achieve statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
One important reason for the loss of statistical significance is that the
sample size of firms that experienced bankruptcy or liquidation is far
smaller than the sample size of those that disappeared from the data set
for any reason (only 303 firms over the 1999–2010 period as opposed
to 6,100 firms). We therefore are cautious about relying too heavily on
this second set of estimates. The only employee ownership measure for
which the hazard rate is statistically significant in column 2 is EO stock
per worker, which reveals that firms with an extra $1,000 of EO stock
were linked to a 22.4 percent lower risk of experiencing bankruptcy or
liquidation in any given year during the 1999–2010 period.
To what extent does employment stability mediate or facilitate the
positive influence of employee ownership on a firm’s likelihood of persisting through negative economic downturns? We investigated whether
the positive link between employee ownership and firm survival identi-
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fied in the above analysis might be partially explained by the employment stability effect of employee ownership. To explore this, we added
a control for employment variability to the Cox proportional hazard
regression for each employee ownership measure examined above. The
idea is to compare the relative hazard ratio in each employee ownership
regression before versus after employment variability is controlled for.
The employment variability measure we constructed for this purpose is
the standard deviation of annual change in the natural log of employment in each company from 1999 to 2010. Appendix Table 4A.2 presents the counterparts of the estimates for firm disappearance for any
reason where we also control for employment variability in the Cox
proportional hazard regressions. If the relative hazard ratio after controlling for employment variability is closer to one than in the similar
specification in column 1 of Table 4.2 that does not control for employment variability, then we can say that employment stability appears to
help explain the positive link between employee ownership and firm
survival. This is only true in the models where employee ownership is
measured by whether the firm has any employee ownership and by the
share of workers at the firm participating in employee ownership. In
the regressions using the other employee ownership variables, the hazard ratio is further from one than it was in the column 1 specifications
from Table 4.2. Therefore, employment stability does not appear to be
a major factor in explaining the link between employee ownership and
firm survival.
We close this section with a discussion about some caveats. It is
important to note that the empirical analysis above does not identify
a causal relationship, but simply an observed correlation between
employee ownership and firm survival. The fact that employee ownership firms persist for longer periods of time may partially reflect selfselection of both the firms and the workers employed at the EO firms.
For example, it may be that employee ownership firms are more likely
to self-select into markets or sectors where firm dissolution is more
rare; we have tried to address this concern by including industry controls in our hazard regressions. Additionally, there may be self-selection
of workers into EO firms in a way that makes these firms more likely
to persist. Workers may self-select by unobservable characteristics that
can affect firm survival. As Chiaporri and Salanié (2003) point out, a
combination of unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous matching
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of agents to employment contracts can create selection based on the
parameters of interest. For example, if more productive or motivated
workers are drawn to work at firms that share wealth with their employees through their EO schemes, then these firms may be more likely to
succeed during turbulent times.
Alas, selection is a potential threat to identifying a causal relationship in all studies using nonexperimental data (Kremer 1997). Selection bias is most effectively controlled for through random assignment
in true experiments. While there have not been any true experiments
in the survival of employee ownership firms, it is worth noting that
true experiments have been conducted regarding the economic performance effects of group-based incentives, with results indicating causal
effects on performance. A randomized field experiment shows favorable effects of firm-based financial incentives on turnover and productivity (Peterson and Luthans 2006). This is complemented by laboratory experiments conducted by Frohlich et al. (1998), who find higher
productivity in researcher-designed “employee-owned firms,” and by
Mellizo (2013), who finds that when subjects are randomly assigned to
shared versus individual flat-wage compensation contracts, shared pay
motivates higher individual performance, even in the absence of other
high-performance workplace practices like decision-making autonomy.
While randomized experiments are hard to imagine on the topic of
firm survival, these results call out for innovative research strategies to
determine the causal role of employee ownership.

CONCLUSION
This chapter has shown that publicly traded companies in the United
States with employee ownership programs were more likely to survive
the last two recessions. From a research perspective, this is important because it raises questions about the mechanisms and workplace
dynamics underlying employee ownership and firm survival, suggesting that employee ownership may affect firm incentives and policies
in a way that enhances firm sustainability. It is possible, for example,
that employee ownership combines with employee involvement, job
training, and job security to create an “ownership culture” that may not
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only improve short-term performance but also contribute to employee
commitment and innovative ideas that enhance long-term survival. We
shed more light on this possibility in the next chapter.
From a policy perspective, our finding that firms with employee
ownership were more likely to survive these recessions is an important
result, because higher survival rates among employee ownership companies could lead to lower job loss rates and unemployment. Employee
ownership may therefore serve as an economy-wide policy instrument
to lower job loss through increasing the likelihood of firm survival. This
indicates positive externalities on the overall economy and government
expenditures (e.g., for unemployment compensation and social programs) that would justify supportive public policy, given the large economic and social costs of unemployment resulting from firm closings.

Notes
1. However, it is important to note that recent laboratory experiments conducted by
Mellizo (2013) in which subjects are randomly assigned to shared versus individual flat-wage compensation contracts show that shared pay motivates higher
individual performance even in the absence of other high-performance workplace
practices like decision-making autonomy.
2. We also tested probit models predicting firm death, and these had a similar pattern
and strength of results.
3. The Cox proportional hazards model specifies that the hazard rate (i.e., the probability of failure) for firm j with characteristics Xj is
h(t|Xj) = h0(t) × exp(Xjβ) ,
and no functional form is imposed on the baseline hazard h0(t), which is assumed
to be the same for all observations. The semiparametric nature of the Cox model
makes it more appealing than other hazard models, which make parametric
assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard like the Weibull model. One
firm’s hazard is thus simply a multiple of another’s, with a constant relative hazard
ratio given by
h(t/Xj) / h(t|Xm) = exp(Xjβ) / exp(Xmβ).
Specifications with Weibull survival models also yielded similar results.
4. These figures pertain to firm failure for any reason; figures for failure strictly due
to bankruptcy or liquidation appear similar despite the considerably smaller sample sizes.
5. A similar pattern is observed when we compare trajectories by presence of
employee ownership in all years during 1999–2010.

Appendix 4A
Tables
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Panel A: Any EO

Any EO

(1)
Disappeared
for any
reason
0.841***
(0.0290)

Employment
Union pension plan
Industry controls
Observations
Number of firms
Number of failures
Time at risk
Log pseudo likelihood

No
95,855
13,580
6,869
2.720e + 07
−63,269

(2)
Disappeared
for any
reason
0.752***
(0.0276)
0.984***
(0.00219)
0.925
(0.0518)
No
82,900
12,461
6,100
1.890e + 07
−54,310

(3)
Disappeared
for any
reason
0.786***
(0.0291)
0.982***
(0.00247)
0.964
(0.0551)
Yes
82,900
12,461
6,100
1.890e + 07
−54,201

(4)
(5)
(6)
Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec.
of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or
liquidation
liquidation
liquidation
0.740*
0.743*
0.928
(0.122)
(0.126)
(0.164)
0.929***
0.925***
(0.0236)
(0.0238)
0.939
1.056
(0.256)
(0.301)
No
No
Yes
95,855
82,900
82,900
13,580
12,461
12,461
341
303
303
2.720e + 07
1.890e + 07
1.890e + 07
−3,121
−2,669
−2,588

NOTE: Column entries are hazard ratios. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the
0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 4A.1 Relationship between Employee Ownership and Firm Survival: Cox Proportional Hazard Regressions
Predicting Firm Survival over 1999–2010

Panel B: ESOP

ESOP

(1)

(2)

(3)

Disappeared
for any reason

Disappeared for
any reason

Disappeared
for any reason

0.747***
(0.0405)
0.984***
(0.00229)
0.898*
(0.0499)
No
82,900
12,461
6,100
1.890e + 07
−54,326

0.821***
(0.0453)
0.981***
(0.00257)
0.935
(0.0533)
Yes
82,900
12,461
6,100
1.890e + 07
−54,216

0.801***
(0.0409)

Employment
Union pension plan
Industry controls
Observations
Number of firms
Number of failures
Time at risk
Log pseudo likelihood

No
95,855
13,580
6,869
2.720e + 07
−63,272

(4)
(5)
(6)
Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec.
of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or
liquidation
liquidation
liquidation
0.585**
(0.155)

No
95,855
13,580
341
2.720e + 07
−3,120

0.653
(0.177)
0.926***
(0.0243)
0.924
(0.253)
No
82,900
12,461
303
1.890e + 07
−2,669

0.900
(0.258)
0.924***
(0.0236)
1.053
(0.305)
Yes
82,900
12,461
303
1.890e + 07
−2,588

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01
level.
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Table 4A.1 (continued)

Panel C: EO Stock per Worker

EO stock per worker

(1)

(2)

(3)

Disappeared for
any reason

Disappeared
for any reason

Disappeared
for any reason

0.988***
(0.00236)

0.985***
(0.00253)
0.983***
(0.00229)
0.902**
(0.0498)
No
82,721
12,458
6,088
1.883e + 07
−54,193

0.987***
(0.00243)
0.980***
(0.00256)
0.940
(0.0531)
Yes
82,721
12,458
6,088
1.883e + 07
−54,088

Employment
Union pension plan
Industry controls
Observations
Number of firms
Number of failures
Time at risk
Log pseudo likelihood

No
95,240
13,562
6,821
2.702e + 07
−62,775

(4)
(5)
(6)
Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec.
of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or
liquidation
liquidation
liquidation
0.741***
(0.0720)

No
95,240
13,562
337
2.702e + 07
−3,060

0.743***
(0.0710)
0.928***
(0.0243)
1.130
(0.303)
No
82,721
12,458
302
1.883e + 07
−2,636

0.776***
(0.0681)
0.927***
(0.0236)
1.305
(0.363)
Yes
82,721
12,458
302
1.883e + 07
−2,561

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01
level.

Panel D: EO Percent of Company Owned > 5%

EO % of company
owned >5%

(1)

(2)

Disappeared for
any reason
0.807***

Disappeared for
any reason
0.717***

(0.0640)

(0.0587)
0.983***
(0.00231)
0.876**
(0.0485)
No
82,900
12,461
6,100
1.890e + 07
−54,332

Employment
Union pension plan
Industry controls
Observations
Number of firms
Number of failures
Time at risk
Log pseudo likelihood

No
95,855
13,580
6,869
2.720e + 07
−63,278

(3)

(4)
(5)
(6)
Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec.
Disappeared for of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or
any reason
liquidation
liquidation
liquidation
0.772***
0.602
0.635
0.813
(0.0637)
0.980***
(0.00257)
0.920
(0.0521)
Yes
82,900
12,461
6,100
1.890e + 07
−54,217

(0.248)

No
95,855
13,580
341
2.720e + 07
−3,122

(0.259)
0.925***
(0.0246)
0.896
(0.241)
No
82,900
12,461
303
1.890e + 07
−2,670

(0.337)
0.924***
(0.0237)
1.050
(0.296)
Yes
82,900
12,461
303
1.890e + 07
−2,588

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01
level.

107

Panel E: Employee Owners as Percentage of All Employees
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)
(5)
(6)
Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec.
Disappeared for Disappeared for Disappeared for of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or
Variables
any reason
any reason
any reason
liquidation
liquidation
liquidation
Employee owners as %
0.848***
0.727***
0.776***
0.602**
0.596**
0.800
of all employees
(0.0379)
(0.0332)
(0.0359)
(0.140)
(0.134)
(0.186)
Employment
0.984***
0.981***
0.929***
0.926***
(0.00224)
(0.00251)
(0.0234)
(0.0233)
Union pension plan
0.906*
0.946
0.951
1.075
(0.0505)
(0.0539)
(0.257)
(0.304)
Industry controls
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Observations
95,424
82,899
82,899
95,424
82,899
82,899
Number of firms
13,565
12,461
12,461
13,565
12,461
12,461
Number of failures
6,834
6,100
6,100
339
303
303
Time at risk
2.700e + 07
1.890e + 07
1.890e + 07
2.700e + 07
1.890e + 07
1.890e + 07
Log pseudo likelihood
−62,917
−54,316
−54,207
−3,100
−2,668
−2,588
NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01
level.
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Table 4A.1 (continued)

Panel F: ESOP Participants as Percentage of All Employees

ESOP participants as
% of all employees

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)
(5)
(6)
Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec.
Disappeared for Disappeared for Disappeared for of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or
any reason
any reason
any reason
liquidation
liquidation
liquidation
0.706***
0.661***
0.756***
0.291**
0.336**
0.512
(0.0544)

(0.0507)
0.983***
(0.00230)
0.889**
(0.0492)
No
82,898
12,461
6,100
1.890e + 07
−54,325

(0.0590)
0.980***
(0.00256)
0.929
(0.0527)
Yes
82,898
12,461
6,100
1.890e + 07
−54,216

Employment
Union pension plan
Industry controls
Observations
Number of firms
Number of failures
Time at risk
Log pseudo likelihood

No
95,611
13,565
6,842
2.710e + 07
−63,000

(0.147)

No
95,611
13,565
341
2.710e + 07
−3,117

(0.161)
0.927***
(0.0243)
0.936
(0.253)
No
82,898
12,461
303
1.890e + 07
−2,667

(0.251)
0.926***
(0.0234)
1.087
(0.309)
Yes
82,898
12,461
303
1.890e + 07
−2,587

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01
level.
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Any EO
ESOP
EO assets per employee
EO % of company owned
>5%
Employee owners as % of
all employees

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Disappeared for Disappeared for Disappeared for Disappeared for Disappeared for Disappeared for
any reason
any reason
any reason
any reason
any reason
any reason
0.802***
(0.0351)
0.780***
(0.0509)
0.985***
(0.00306)
0.698***
(0.0716)
0.792***
(0.0427)

ESOP participants as % of
all employees
Employment
Union pension
Employment variation
Industry controls

0.693***

0.982***
(0.00305)
0.981
(0.0654)
0.987
(0.0247)
Yes

0.981***
(0.00314)
0.967
(0.0640)
0.995
(0.0246)
Yes

0.981***
(0.00312)
0.971
(0.0639)
0.992
(0.0247)
Yes

0.980***
(0.00316)
0.947
(0.0623)
0.996
(0.0246)
Yes

0.981***
(0.00309)
0.965
(0.0641)
0.989
(0.0247)
Yes

(0.0650)
0.981***
(0.00314)
0.960
(0.0633)
0.995
(0.0246)
Yes
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Table 4A.2 Cox Proportional Hazard Estimates of the Role of Employment Stability in Explaining the Relationship
between Employee Ownership and Firm Survival

Observations
Number of firms
Number of failures
Time at risk
Log pseudo likelihood

78,660
9,627
4,072
1.510e + 07
−35,672

78,660
9,627
4,072
1.510e + 07
−35,677

78,488
9,626
4,064
1.505e + 07
−35,588

78,660
9,627
4,072
1.510e + 07
−35,678

78,660
9,627
4,072
1.510e + 07
−35,675

78,659
9,627
4,072
1.510e + 07
−35,676

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01
level.
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5
Why Do Employee
Ownership Firms Have Greater
Stability and Survival?
Why are employee ownership firms more likely to be stable and
long lived? Two possible explanations are that either greater compensation flexibility or greater productivity in employee ownership firms
accounts for their greater stability and survival. This chapter presents
evidence on both these explanations. As will be seen, neither of them
provides a full explanation of the greater stability and survival, although
the evidence suggests support for a refined version of the productivity
explanation.

PAY LEVELS AND FLEXIBILITY
There are two possible ways in which employee ownership may
provide pay flexibility to the firm in times of financial distress. First,
employers’ yearly contributions to employee ownership plans may be
more flexible than other types of compensation. When sales decline or
other types of negative demand shocks occur, the company may contribute less stock (or money to buy stock) to employee accounts in an
employee ownership plan. This type of flexibility is no different from
the flexibility that employers have in all defined contribution pension
plans: the fact that the contribution is made in stock rather than cash (as
in a deferred profit-sharing plan) does not affect the perceived cost of
labor from the firm’s perspective.
A second source of pay flexibility may be linked specifically to
employee ownership if the company stock substitutes in whole or part
for fixed pay. The total shareholder return (annual dividend and change
in company stock value) may be seen as part of employees’ annual
compensation. In this case, when negative demand shocks occur, the
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decrease in company stock value provides an automatic pay cut for
workers. Since the fixed component of pay would be lower in this circumstance, firms will have less incentive to lay off workers and are
likely to have a higher probability of survival.
There is very little prior evidence on the topic of flexibility in pay
among employee ownership firms. We explore this with our Form
5500–Compustat data, measuring pay flexibility in four ways. The first
two ways consider just the employer’s average annual contribution to
compensation per employee, measured either as total compensation per
employee (which is reported by fewer than one-fourth of all firms in
any year) or merely as total pension expenses per employee (reported
for all firms). Compensation flexibility in both cases is computed as the
standard deviation of compensation per employee at a given firm over
the period 1999–2011, after adjusting for annual compensation growth.1
In Appendix Table 5A.1 we show that there is little statistically significant association between employee ownership and these two measures
of flexibility (columns 1 and 2). Not surprisingly, there is more flexibility associated with employee ownership when shareholder returns
are included as part of compensation. The third and fourth measures
in Table 5A.1 add dividends and stock price changes to the employeeowned stock (columns 3 and 4) and show greater pay flexibility associated with all the employee ownership measures. The coefficients
in Panel A indicate that considering shareholder return as part of pay
roughly doubles the yearly variation in pay.2
Pay Levels
While these last two results point to greater pay risk associated with
employee ownership, a key issue in considering the effects of pay flexibility is whether the variable pay substitutes for fixed pay or benefits. If
it does not substitute, and instead comes wholly on top of market levels
of fixed pay and benefits, then employee ownership firms will not enjoy
any cost advantage in hiring or retaining workers when bad times hit.
(In economic terms, the marginal cost of labor would be just as high
among employee ownership firms as among those without employee
ownership.) In addition, employees would not face extra financial risk
in their basic compensation, since the pay variability would occur in the
above-market component of their compensation.
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As reviewed in Chapter 1, past research indicates that employee
ownership tends to come on top of market levels of pay. It is rare for
employee ownership to be part of wage or benefit concessions, and
studies find that employee ownership firms have average base wages
that are as high as, or higher than, those in comparable firms without
employee ownership. There is also clear evidence that base pay levels
do not generally decrease when ESOPs are adopted in public companies (Kim and Ouimet 2014).
Employee ownership also generally comes on top of standard pay
among the firms in our data set. We summarize key results in Table
5.1, with more detail in Appendix Table 5A.2. We present estimates
that include comparisons both within and between firms (using randomeffect specifications) and only within firms (using fixed-effects specifications). The former comparisons answer the question of how employee
ownership relates to compensation levels in general, while the latter
comparisons answer the question of what types of changes occur in
compensation within a firm when employee ownership is increased or
decreased. As can be seen in Table 5.1, employee ownership is associated with higher compensation under either type of comparison. The
most telling result is found in column 1 of Table 5.1. If employee ownership substitutes for standard pay, then it should be associated with
lower levels of pay, excluding pension contributions. It is not—in fact,
nonpension pay is positively linked to employee ownership, with figures indicating between 1.4 and 7.4 percent higher pay across three
key measures of employee ownership. Column 2 shows that pension
contributions are significantly higher (11.6 percent) in companies with
employee ownership, and that they increase by an average of 4.4 percent when companies adopt employee ownership. Combining pension
and nonpension data, column 3 shows that employee ownership is
linked to 4.0 percent higher compensation in general and a 2.1 percent
increase within a firm when employee ownership is added to compensation. These pay differentials are strengthened when shareholder returns
are considered part of employee compensation, as shown in column 4.
In sum, there is no support for the idea that employee ownership
generally substitutes for standard pay or benefits. Given this, there is no
plausible mechanism by which increased pay flexibility under employee
ownership can lead to increased stability or survival.

Average pay difference associated with any
employee ownership in firm
Comparing both across and within firms
Comparing only within firms over time
Average pay difference associated with 100%
of employees covered by employee
ownership plan
Comparing both across and within firms
Comparing only within firms over time
Average pay difference associated with mean
of employee-owned stock per employee
($10,540)
Comparing both across and within firms
Comparing only within firms over time

Total nonpension
compensation per
employee

Total pension
contribution per
employee

Total compensation
Total compensation
plus shareholder
per employee
returns per employeea

3.5
1.4

11.6
4.4

4.0
2.1

4.5
3.7

7.4
6.1

20.7
13.8

8.8
7.7

8.3
7.0

2.6
2.1

4.9
1.6

2.6
2.3

3.3
2.9

NOTE: Based on results from Appendix Table 5A.2. Results for “comparing both across and within firms” are based on random-effects
specifications, and results for “comparing just within firms over time” are based on fixed effects. Figures in bold are based on statistically
significant differences at the 95% level.
a
Column 4 is based on smaller sample than column 3, accounting for lower figures in rows 3 and 4.
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Table 5.1 Summary of Results on Pay Levels and Employee Ownership (%)
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PRODUCTIVITY
The greater stability and survival of employee ownership companies may be due in part to higher productivity. This may happen in one
of two ways. First, there may be a simple mediation effect if employee
ownership leads to higher productivity (through increased effort, cooperation, monitoring of coworkers, attraction of higher-quality workers,
etc.) and the higher productivity leads to greater stability and survival.
In this case, the effect of employee ownership should disappear when
controlling for productivity level. Second, there may be a more complex
mechanism through which employee ownership influences survival and
stability through productivity: firms that give stock to employees may
try to create an employee ownership culture with a greater sense of
ownership, and the sense of ownership is contingent on increased job
security, since it is difficult to make employees feel like owners when
they are just as likely to be laid off as in any other firm. In this case,
employee ownership may be linked to greater productivity in general;
however, even when firms are suffering productivity problems, they
may want to restrict layoffs in order to maintain an ownership culture,
so that ownership may have an effect on stability and survival even
when the firm undergoes low-productivity years. As reviewed in Chapter 1, prior research strongly supports the idea that employee ownership
is linked to higher productivity, on average.
We first add to the prior literature by estimating the relationship
between employee ownership and productivity in our sample. To do
this, we use a standard specification based on a production function to
control for other influences on productivity. In addition, we examine
within-firm as well as between-firm variation.3
The findings from our data set are consistent with prior results. As
summarized in Table 5.2 (with further detail in Appendix Table 5A.6),
employee ownership is linked to 2.9 percent higher productivity using
both within- and between-firm comparisons, and 2.4 percent higher
productivity using only within-firm comparisons, and the former but
not the latter comparison can reject a zero effect. Employee ownership is also strongly linked to productivity when measured as stock per
employee (a 2.5–2.6 percent increase associated with average stock per
employee) or as percentage of employees covered (a 7.8–12.5 percent
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Table 5.2 Summary of Results on Productivity Levels and Employee
Ownership
Productivity
difference (%)
Average productivity difference associated with any
employee ownership in firm
2.9
Comparing both across and within firms
Comparing only within firms over time
2.4
Average productivity difference associated with median
level of employee-owned stock per employee ($10,540)
2.6
Comparing both across and within firms
2.5
Comparing only within firms over time
Average productivity difference associated with 100% of
employees covered by employee ownership plan
7.8
Comparing both across and within firms
12.5
Comparing only within firms over time
NOTE: Based on results from Appendix Table 5A.6. Results for “comparing both
across and within firms” are based on random-effects specifications, and results for
“comparing only within firms over time” are based on fixed effects. Figures in bold
are based on statistically significant differences at the 95% level.

increase associated with 100 percent of employees covered). Further
results in Appendix Table 5A.6 show that the companies in which
employees own less than 3 percent of company stock have stronger
productivity increases than the companies with a higher percentage
owned, as is consistent with the findings of Kim and Ouimet (2014)
that small ESOPs are associated with stronger productivity effects than
large ESOPs.
These results make it plausible that higher productivity accounts for
the greater stability and survival of employee ownership firms uncovered in the preceding two chapters. To investigate this, we add productivity controls to the benchmark regression models for employment
stability from Chapter 3 and for firm survival from Chapter 4. We test
for the influence of productivity as a simple mediator in three ways: first
by controlling for the prior year’s productivity level, then by controlling
for the average productivity level of the company, and finally by controlling for the interaction of productivity and employment changes.4
Our tests show that there is no simple connection between the productivity of employee ownership firms and their survival or stability.
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We do not report a summary table, since the estimated employee ownership effects change very little when controlling for productivity, and the
results are easily summarized in the text. We report regression results in
Appendix Table 5A.3 and 5A.4. As can be seen in column 2 of Appendix Table 5A.3, higher average productivity predicts a higher likelihood
of disappearance for any reason, which probably indicates that highproductivity firms are tempting targets for mergers and acquisitions.
Using the stricter definition of firm death (columns 4–6 of Appendix
Table 5A.3), higher productivity not surprisingly predicts a lower likelihood of firm death due to bankruptcy or liquidation, although a zero
effect can be rejected only for productivity in the prior year.
For our purposes, the important result is that employee ownership
remains a statistically significant predictor of greater survival in columns 1 to 3 after controlling for either productivity variable (i.e., comparing the hazard rate for employee ownership in column 1, which does
not control for productivity, against the hazard rate for employee ownership in columns 2 and 3, which do have productivity controls). This
is true whether employee ownership is measured as the presence of any
employee ownership (Panel A), average stock per employee (Panel B),
or percentage of employees covered (Panel C). Controlling for productivity likewise has little effect in columns 4 to 6 on the relationship of
employee ownership to disappearance due to bankruptcy or liquidation.
A similar exploration of firm employment stability is undertaken
in Appendix Table 5A.4. Columns 1 and 4 present regressions equivalent to those in Appendix Table 3A.1 in Chapter 3 but are restricted to
firms with complete information for productivity estimates. We compare these to columns 2 and 5, which add the prior year’s productivity
as a control, and to columns 3 and 6, which add interactions between
a firm’s average productivity and the demand shocks. The response to
recessionary pressures (measured by increases in the unemployment
rate) remains lower among employee ownership firms after controlling
for the prior year’s productivity level (columns 2 and 5). It is possible
that the relationship is due to high-productivity firms having smaller
responses to recessionary pressures; however, controlling for interactions of unemployment changes with average firm productivity shows
that employee ownership continues to be linked to smaller employment
cutbacks as the unemployment rate increases (columns 3 and 6).
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Therefore, productivity does not explain in a simple way the greater
survival and stability of employee ownership firms. It is possible that
external factors explain the greater survival and stability—for example,
perhaps customers of employee ownership firms are more loyal because
of better customer service. It is also possible that internal factors associated with employee ownership are responsible—for example, perhaps
employee ownership companies are less likely to have high executive
pay and incentives skewed toward excessively risky decisions (such as
executive stock options that reward executives for strong gains but do
not penalize them for losses).5
We can shed some light on why employee ownership firms have
greater stability by conducting further tests of the productivity relationship. Employee ownership firms may lay off fewer workers in recessions and instead assign workers to training or other activities that can
build skills or long-term productivity. While these activities may not
contribute to short-term productivity, they can help maintain a sense
of ownership and ownership culture that contribute to long-term productivity and survival. If this is the case, short-term productivity for
employee ownership firms should go down in recessions as workers
are retained while sales decrease (i.e., the numerator in the productivity
measure decreases more than the denominator decreases).
This idea receives strong support, as summarized in Table 5.3,
based on coefficients reported in Appendix Table 5A.5. This is based
on productivity regressions that interact employee ownership with the
unemployment rate, testing whether the relationship of employee ownership to productivity is related to the level of demand in the economy.
While Table 5.2 showed that employee ownership is generally associated with higher productivity, Table 5.3 shows that this relationship is
contingent on overall demand in the economy. There is a positive main
effect on the employee ownership measures but a negative interaction
between employee ownership and the unemployment rate, indicating
that the relative productivity of employee ownership firms is high when
the economy is strong and decreases when the economy is weak, as the
employee ownership firms lay off fewer workers. For example, Table
5.3 shows that in a nonrecession year with unemployment at 5.0 percent, employee ownership firms would have a productivity advantage
of 2.4–4.0 percent, while in a recession year with 8.0 percent unemployment, their productivity would be 1.0–1.8 percent lower than that

Table 5.3 Summary of Results on Employee Ownership and Productivity in Recession and Nonrecession Years
Employee ownership
Employee ownership
productivity difference productivity difference
(in %) in nonrecession (in %) in recession year
year (unempl. = 5%)
(unempl. = 8%)
Average productivity difference (in %) associated with any employee
ownership in firm
Comparing both across and within firms
4.0
−1.8
Comparing only within firms over time
3.3
−1.0
Average productivity difference (in %) associated with median level of
employee-owned stock per employee ($10,540)
Comparing both across and within firms
3.1
0.9
Comparing only within firms over time
3.6
2.9
Average productivity difference (in %) associated with 100% of
employees covered by employee ownership plan
Comparing both across and within firms
9.5
2.5
Comparing only within firms over time
20.9
16.3
NOTE: Based on coefficients from Appendix Table 5A.5. Results for “comparing both across and within firms” are based on randomeffects specifications, and results for “comparing only within firms over time” are based on fixed effects.
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of other comparable firms. Measuring employee ownership as average
stock per employee or share of employee covered also shows that the
productivity advantage of employee ownership firms goes down in
recessions.
While there are no direct data available on how employee ownership
firms reassign workers when demand decreases, these results combined
with the lower layoffs in employee ownership firms support the idea
that they are more likely to put workers in training or in other activities
that do not contribute to short-term productivity but may build skills
that support greater long-term productivity. A complementary explanation concerns the firm’s incentive to retain workers with firm-specific
skills when demand decreases, given human capital theory’s prediction that firms will share in the costs of firm-specific training and thus
have an incentive to maintain the relationship in order to recoup those
costs. Investing in an employee ownership culture, in which workers
are encouraged to cooperate and share information, may be seen as a
type of investment in firm-specific skills, since cooperation and information sharing may be contingent on building trust and good relationships in a team environment, and such relationships are firm specific. In
other words, companies may not want to disrupt good working relationships, both among coworkers and between managers and employees,
by engaging in layoffs when demand declines, since those relationships
may be important for higher productivity after demand recovers.

CONCLUSION
This chapter explores the reasons behind the higher survival and
stability of employee ownership firms, focusing on the potential roles
of pay flexibility and productivity. Pay is found to be more flexible
in employee ownership firms only when total shareholder return is
counted as part of compensation, but this is not a plausible mechanism
for greater stability or survival, given that the employee ownership
comes on top of standard pay and benefits. Any increased flexibility
comes in above-market compensation, and the firm would not experience labor cost savings when bad times occur.
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The relation of productivity to employee ownership is more promising for providing lessons about stability and survival. Consistent with
prior evidence, we find that employee ownership is linked to higher
productivity on average, when making comparisons both among firms
and within firms. The effect of employee ownership on survival and stability, however, is maintained when controlling for productivity levels.
The lesson comes from examining the contingent nature of the relationship between productivity and employee ownership: consistent with
the lower layoffs of employee ownership firms, they have lower shortterm productivity from retaining more workers as the economy worsens. Retaining more workers may help their long-term productivity, by
helping to maintain an employee ownership culture through retaining
firm-specific skills and relationships that support such a culture. If this
interpretation is correct, it suggests there are strong positive externalities from employee ownership because of the fewer layoffs. This helps
to decrease unemployment levels in the economy and maintain purchasing power for greater macroeconomic stability under recessionary
pressures.

Notes
1. To avoid having inflation and general wage trends contribute to the measured variation, the natural logarithm of compensation per employee was first regressed on
year dummies, and flexibility was computed as the within-firm standard deviation
of the residuals in firms with at least three observations.
2. Using the data underlying results in Appendix Table 5A.1, EO firms are predicted
to have pay variability of 0.08 in the absence of EO, and 0.18 with EO, in column
3, while the predicted pay variability in column 4 is 0.41 in the absence of EO and
0.81 with EO.
3. We use a translog specification, with industry and year effects, and both fixedeffects and random-effects models. The estimating equation is
(1) Ln(Q/L) = (ßl−1) × Ln(Lit) + ßk × Ln(K)it + ßll × [Ln(Lit) × Ln(Lit)] +
ßkk × [Ln(Kit) × Ln(Kit)] + ßkl × [Ln(Lit) × Ln(Kit)] +
ßp × EOit +ßd × DBit + ßdt × DCit +
ßind × (industry dummies) + ßy × (year dummies) + ui + eit ,
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where Q = output, defined as sales + inventory change
L = total employees
K = capital stock
EO = employee ownership
DB = defined benefit plan
DC = defined contribution plan
ß = coefficients
u = firm-level fixed or random effect
e = error term
subscript i = firm i, t = year t
4. To generate the productivity variables, a regression based on the productivity
model in endnote 3 was run without the employee ownership and pension variables, and with 12 year dummies and 72 industry dummies as controls. Average
productivity is calculated as the average within-firm residual, and productivity last
year is calculated as last year’s residual.
5. There is no available research on executive pay in employee ownership companies, which is a valuable topic for new research.

Appendix 5A
Tables
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Dependent
variable:

Std. dev. (ln
Std. dev. (ln of
Std. dev. (ln of
Std. dev. (ln of
of pension
total comp. + EO
pension contrib.
total compensation contributions per shareholder returns + EO shareholder
per employee)
employee)
per employee) returns per employee)
Panel A

Any EO lasting full period
n
R-squared

0.004
(0.013)
1,013
0.295

0.006
(0.015)
4,609
0.041

0.100***
(0.016)
1,231
0.353

0.403***
(0.017)
4,294
0.174

0.005***
(0.000)
1,502
0.352

0.012***
(0.001)
5,308
0.113

0.119***
(0.018)
1,494
0.311

0.572***
(0.022)
5,295
0.171

Panel B
Average EO stock per employee
n
R-squared

0.000
(0.000)
1,248
0.267

0.001
(0.001)
5,664
0.044
Panel C

Average % of employees with EO
n
R-squared

−0.004
(0.015)
1,238
0.267

0.006
(0.018)
5,645
0.044
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Table 5A.1 Pay Flexibility and Employee Ownership

Panel D
Average % of firm owned by employees
>0% and <=1%
>1% and <=3%
>3% and <=5%
>5% and <=10%
>10%
n
R-squared

0.015
(0.012)
0.006
(0.014)
0.004
(0.019)
0.006
(0.018)
0.028
(0.024)
1,211
0.276

0.023*
(0.013)
0.004
(0.017)
0.081***
(0.026)
0.012
(0.026)
0.028
(0.036)
5,341
0.044

0.034**
(0.014)
0.052***
(0.016)
0.107***
(0.022)
0.131***
(0.021)
0.235***
(0.029)
1,494
0.333

0.252***
(0.016)
0.425***
(0.020)
0.475***
(0.031)
0.519***
(0.030)
0.672***
(0.043)
5,289
0.197

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
Based on OLS regressions of pay variability measures on EO measures. Each panel represents results of separate regressions. Control
variables include average ln(firm size), average presence of defined benefit plans, average presence of defined contributions plans, plus
71 two-digit industry dummies. Std. dev. = standard deviation; EO = employee ownership; ln = natural logarithm. Standard deviation is
calculated only for firms with three or more pay observations over the 1999–2011 period.

127

Dependent
variable:

Ln(total
compensation per
employee)
Random
Fixed
effects
effects

Ln(pension
contributions per
employee)
Random
Fixed
effects
effects

Ln(total
compensation
excluding pension
contributions per
employee)
Random
Fixed
effects
effects
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Table 5A.2 Pay Levels and Employee Ownership
Ln(total
Ln(pension
compensation + EO contributions + EO
shareholder returns shareholder returns
per employee)
per employee)
Random
Fixed
Random
Fixed
effects
effects
effects
effects

Panel A
Any EO

0.039*** 0.021*
(0.012) (0.012)
12,619
Number of firm-year obs. 14,626
1,888
2,007
Number of firms

0.110*** 0.043** 0.034*** 0.014
(0.015) (0.018) (0.011) (0.012)
12,356
52,619
45,527
14,334
1,861
1,978
7,092
6,772

0.044*** 0.036** 0.288*** 0.111***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.027)
42,282
35,753
12,157
10,286
6,529
6,088
1,750
1,871

Panel B
0.002*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.030*** 0.027***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of firm-year obs. 14,568
12,561
52,494
45,405
14,280
12,303
12,111
10,241
42,202
35,674
Number of firms
2,007
1,887
7,089
6,769
1,977
1,859
1,870
1,748
6,528
6,083
Average EO stock per
employee

Panel C
% of employees with EO

0.084*** 0.074*** 0.188*** 0.129*** 0.071*** 0.059*** 0.080*** 0.068*** 0.363*** 0.127***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.023) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.026) (0.035)
Number of firm-year obs. 13,582
11,593
49,952
42,909
13,291
11,331
11,211
9,361
40,283
33,807
Number of firms
1,989
1,853
7,043
6,676
1,960
1,826
1,850
1,714
6,476
5,967

Panel D
% of firm owned by
employees
>0% and <=1%

0.024
0.020 0.112*** 0.050**
0.019
0.008 0.063*** 0.070*** 0.228*** 0.149***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.020) (0.023) (0.031)
>1% and <=3%
0.067*** 0.052*** 0.161*** 0.053** 0.058*** 0.040*** 0.058*** 0.038* 0.312*** 0.059*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.021) (0.027) (0.035)
>3% and <=5%
0.053*** 0.029 0.128*** 0.024 0.046*** 0.018
0.045**
0.009 0.343*** 0.008
(0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.027) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.034) (0.043)
>5% and <=10%
0.037**
0.010 0.109*** ˗0.021
0.030*
0.000
˗0.023 ˗0.072*** 0.558*** 0.154***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.030) (0.017) (0.018) (0.022) (0.025) (0.038) (0.049)
>10%
0.051**
0.031 0.087*** ˗0.028 0.045**
0.021
0.043
0.009 0.541*** 0.027
(0.023) (0.024) (0.034) (0.038) (0.021) (0.022) (0.028) (0.032) (0.050) (0.065)
Number of firm-year obs. 13,247
11,341
47,073
40,490
13,040
11,160
11,536
9,697
40,628
34,157
Number of firms
1,906
1,770
6,583
6,221
1,880
1,745
1,839
1,705
6,471
5,974
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Based
on panel regressions with random or fixed firm effects, and AR(1) correction. Panels A to D represent results of separate regressions.
Control variables include ln(employment), presence of defined benefit plans, presence of defined contribution plans, plus 12 year dummies and 71 two-digit industry dummies. EO = employee ownership; ln = natural logarithm.
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Dependent
variable:

Disappeared because of
bankruptcy or liquidation

Disappeared for any reason
Panel A

Any EO
Average productivity

−0.352***
(0.045)

−0.354***
(0.045)
0.056**
(0.022)

0.173
(0.197)

0.179
(0.197)
−0.104
(0.121)

54,983

54,983

0.135
(0.196)

−0.194***
(0.056)

0.003
(0.016)

Productivity in prior year
Number of firms
Observations

−0.351***
(0.045)

55,818

54,983

54,983

55,818

−0.211**
(0.087)

−0.210**
(0.087)
−0.105
(0.113)

−0.216**
(0.089)

Panel B
Average EO stock per employee

−0.022***
(0.004)

Average productivity

−0.022***
(0.004)
0.057**
(0.022)

Productivity in prior year
Observations

54,872

54,872

−0.022***
(0.004)

0.003
(0.016)
55,706

54,872

54,872

−0.181***
(0.054)
55,706
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Table 5A.3 Productivity and Firm Survival

Panel C
% of employees with EO

−0.415***
(0.058)

Average productivity

−0.418***
(0.058)
0.057**
(0.022)

Productivity in prior year
Observations

54,983

54,983

−0.410***
(0.058)

0.004
(0.016)
55,818

0.092
(0.255)

54,983

0.103
(0.256)
−0.103
(0.120)

54,983

0.054
(0.254)

−0.192***
(0.055)
55,818

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.
Based on Cox survival regressions. Panels A, B, and C represent results of separate regressions. Control variables include employment,
bargaining status, and nine industry dummies. EO = employee ownership.
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Negative demand shock:
UR increase
Positive demand shock:
UR decrease

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
−0.02790*** −0.02778*** −0.02797*** −0.028*** −0.028*** −0.028*** −0.028*** −0.028*** −0.028***
(0.00137)
(0.00137)
(0.00139)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
0.11089*** 0.11094*** 0.11157*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.113***
(0.00710)

Productivity in prior year
Negative shock interacted
with:
EO assets per employee

(0.00711)
0.01997***
(0.00522)

(0.00717)

(0.008)

(0.008)
0.020***
(0.005)

(0.008)

(0.007)

0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)

ESOP share of employees
Average firm productivity

EO share of employees

(0.007)
0.020***
(0.005)

0.00070*** 0.00068*** 0.00070***
(0.00010)
(0.00010)
(0.00010)

EO share of employees

Positive demand shock
interacted with:
EO assets per employee

(0.007)

0.00083
(0.00238)

0.00084*
(0.00043)

0.00078*
(0.00043)

0.001
(0.002)

0.00087**
(0.00043)
−0.002
(0.015)

−0.003
(0.015)

−0.002
(0.015)

0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004)
0.001
(0.002)
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Table 5A.4 Productivity and Firm Stability

ESOP share of employees
Average firm productivity
Observations
R-squared
Number of firms

54,881
0.20139
8,900

54,881
0.20245
8,900

−0.01023
(0.01235)
54,881
0.20143
8,900

54,983
0.201
8,902

54,983
0.203
8,902

−0.010
(0.012)
54,983
0.202
8,902

−0.006
(0.020)

−0.006
(0.020)

54,983
0.202
8,902

54,983
0.203
8,902

−0.007
(0.020)
−0.010
(0.012)
54,983
0.202
8,902

NOTES: Dependent variable = change in ln(employment). UR = unemployment rate. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant
at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Based on fixed-effects panel regressions with controls
as reported in Table 3A.1. Each column represents a separate regression.
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Table 5A.5 Productivity and Employee Ownership in Recessions
Dependent
variable:

Ln[(sales + inventory
change)/employees]
Random effects
Fixed effects
(1)
(2)
Panel A

Any EO
Unemployment rate
Any EO × unemployment rate
Number of firm-year obs.
Number of firms
Panel B
Average EO stock per employee last year
Unemployment rate
Avg. EO stock last year × unemployment rate
Number of firm-year obs.
Number of firms

0.134***
(0.026)
−0.021***
(0.002)
−0.019***
(0.004)
70,124
10,435

0.102***
(0.026)
−0.025***
(0.002)
−0.014***
(0.004)
59,689
9,122

0.006***
(0.001)
−0.024***
(0.002)
−0.001***
(0.000)
62,280
9,585

0.005***
(0.001)
−0.027***
(0.002)
−0.000
(0.000)
52,695
8,332

0.201***
(0.040)
−0.022***
(0.002)
−0.022***
(0.006)
67,753
10,386

0.255***
(0.041)
−0.023***
(0.002)
−0.013**
(0.006)
57,367
9,038

Panel C
% of employees with EO
Unemployment rate
% of employees with EO × unemployment rate
Number of firm-year obs.
Number of firms

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant
at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Based on panel regressions with
random or fixed firm effects, and AR(1) correction. Panels A to C represent results
of separate regressions. Based on translog specification, with control variables
including ln(employment) alone and squared, ln(capital stock) alone and squared,
ln(employment) × ln(capital stock), presence of defined benefit plans, presence of
defined contribution plans, plus time trend and 71 two-digit industry dummies. EO =
employee ownership; ln = natural logarithm.
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Table 5A.6 Productivity and Employee Ownership
Ln[(sales + inventory change)/employees]
Dependent variable:
Random effects
Fixed effects
Panel A
Any EO
0.029**
0.024
(0.013)
(0.016)
Number of firm-year obs.
70,124
59,689
Number of firms
10,435
9,122
Panel B
Average EO stock per employee
0.002***
0.002***
(0.001)
(0.001)
Number of firm-year obs.
62,280
52,695
Number of firms
9,585
8,332
Panel C
% of employees with EO
0.075***
0.118***
(0.019)
(0.021)
Number of firm-year obs.
67,753
57,367
Number of firms
10,386
9,038
Panel D
% of firm owned by employees
>0% and <=1%
0.037**
0.033*
(0.016)
(0.018)
>1% and <=3%
0.036*
0.045**
(0.019)
(0.021)
>3% and <=5%
0.028
0.022
(0.023)
(0.026)
>5% and <=10%
0.020
0.009
(0.026)
(0.029)
>10%
0.023
0.005
(0.033)
(0.036)
Number of firm-year obs.
62,628
53,160
Number of firms
9,468
8,245
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant
at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Based on panel regressions with
random or fixed firm effects, and AR(1) correction. Panels A to D represent results
of separate regressions. Based on translog specification, with control variables
including ln(employment) alone and squared, ln(capital stock) alone and squared,
ln(employment) × ln(capital stock), presence of defined benefit plans, presence of
defined contribution plans, plus 12 year dummies and 71 two-digit industry dummies.
EO = employee ownership; ln=natural logarithm.

6
Conclusions and Policy Implications
In this final chapter, our goal is to bring together all the evidence
we have presented in this book to make a case for why broad-based
employee ownership is appealing, discuss the policy case for employee
ownership, and present a list of concrete policy recommendations that
can increase the prevalence of employee ownership in our society.
Broad-based sharing in company ownership and in the rewards of
economic prosperity has a long and rich history in the United States,
with roots that can be traced to the philosophies of the founding fathers.
As described in Chapter 2, George Washington’s Treasury secretary,
Alexander Hamilton, was a proponent of share schemes and advanced
a bill, which Congress passed in 1792 and Washington signed into law,
that strengthened share schemes in the cod fishing industry. Thomas
Jefferson’s Treasury secretary, Albert Gallatin, spearheaded a profitsharing plan in 1795 in his Philadelphia Glass Works company because
he believed such a system was important for the newly developing U.S.
democracy. With a similar motive, Thomas Jefferson greatly expanded
the size of the United States through the Louisiana Purchase with the
goal of increasing opportunities for broad-based ownership of land, and
this goal was later realized through the Homestead Act. Broadening
the distribution of wealth was a key underlying driver for the creation
of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and their institutionalization through the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), spearheaded by Louisiana senator Russell Long.
Interest in employee ownership can be categorized into four main
sources, as described in Chapter 1:
1) Increased economic performance
2) Greater job security and firm survival
3) More-broadly shared prosperity
4) Less labor-management conflict and higher quality of work life
Our findings in this book are focused on the second source of interest—job security and firm survival—but also shed light on the issues of
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economic performance and broadly shared prosperity. Using matched
Form 5500–Compustat longitudinal data on the universe of publicly
traded firms in the United States from 1999 to 2011, we have examined
how firms with employee ownership programs weathered the recessions of 2001 and 2008 relative to firms without employee ownership
programs. Our key results are that
• employee ownership firms exhibit greater employment stability
in the face of economy-wide and firm-specific shocks (Chapter
3) and
• employee ownership firms had greater survival likelihood in
the face of recession, with a lower likelihood of failure (bankruptcy or liquidation) or of disappearance because of mergers
and acquisitions (Chapter 4).
• These findings are not explained by greater compensation flexibility or lower wages in employee ownership firms; in fact,
employee ownership tends to come on top of base pay that is
higher, and no more variable, than in other firms. Productivity
is higher on average in employee ownership firms, and the pattern across the business cycle suggests a plausible explanation
for the stability and survival results: the productivity advantage
of employee ownership firms drops during recessions, indicating
that they may retain more workers as a way to facilitate longterm productivity and survival by helping maintain firm-specific
human capital and working relationships (Chapter 5). While
workplace culture may also help to explain the greater survival
of employee ownership firms, we do not have enough information to provide a strong explanation for the increased survival.
Overall, these results imply that at a macroeconomic level, employee
ownership may play a role in decreasing unemployment and helping to
stabilize the economy under recessionary pressures.
One interesting question is which dimensions of employee ownership contribute the most to stability and survival. Throughout the book,
we have described the potential benefits of employee ownership on
workplace culture: it can contribute to an environment that promotes
higher productivity, greater stability, and higher rates of survival. We do
not have measures of workplace culture in this data set, so we cannot
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draw conclusions on its importance. In comparing the different measures
of employee ownership, we find that stability and survival are linked to
greater degrees of employee ownership as measured by employer stock
per employee, percentage of company owned by employees, and share
of employees who are employee owners. While each of these is important, the greatest explanatory power comes from the share of employees
who are employee owners, which is the variable most consistent with
the idea that it is a cooperative workplace rather than direct financial
incentives that drive the improved productivity, stability, and survival.1

LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
As in all nonexperimental research, we cannot fully resolve the
issue of causality. It may be that firms that are more stable or have a
higher likelihood of survival are more likely to adopt employee ownership, or that there are other unobserved factors—such as management
quality or philosophy, or use of other high-performance work policies—that explain the relationship. Even if other factors are responsible
for the stability and survival, it is nonetheless noteworthy that these are
accompanied by employee ownership, indicating that employee ownership may be used to reinforce the stability and survival prospects.
In addition, there is a plausible story that employee ownership plays
a direct role based on the finding that the productivity advantage of
employee ownership firms disappears in recessions as they hold onto
workers, possibly as a way of maintaining an ownership culture and
retaining firm-specific skills. The evidence is clear that employee ownership is associated with higher productivity on average, but this has
not been studied across the business cycle. While laboratory and field
experiments that control for selection and other biases have shed light
on the productivity effects and financial incentives of employee ownership (Frohlich et al. 1998; Mellizo 2013; Peterson and Luthans 2006), it
is difficult to conceive of an experiment that tests the employment stability and survival effects of employee ownership. A promising method
of examining the possible causal mechanisms would be to combine
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additional analysis of large data sets with in-depth case studies of how
employee ownership firms cope with recessions.
One advantage of our data is that we have the entire population,
rather than just a sample, of U.S. publicly traded companies over the
1999–2011 period. This means that we do not have to worry about generalizing our results to the population for this period; however, there is
still uncertainty about generalizing the results of this period to future
periods, and to firms without employee ownership if they were somehow induced or made to adopt employee ownership. If some of the public policies discussed below were implemented and were successful in
increasing the adoption of employee ownership, it is possible that these
new adopters would not exhibit the same behavior as the employee
ownership firms we have studied, because (for example) they may be
taking advantage of tax incentives rather than developing an ownership
culture that supports stability and survival. There are, however, a number of countries (such as the United Kingdom) where the government
implemented tax incentives (Oxera Consulting 2007a,b,c), as discussed
earlier in this book, and the findings on firms’ responses to these law
changes are generally consistent with our findings for the United States
in this book.
There is also a question as to how our results from publicly traded
firms would generalize to closely held firms.2 Closely held firms, also
known as privately held firms, are firms that are owned by a relatively
small number of shareholders or employees and whose shares are not
traded on stock market exchanges but, rather, are offered and exchanged
privately. The results in this book are consistent with the one existing
study on stability and survival among closely held firms with employee
ownership (Blasi, Kruse, and Weltmann 2013), but there is a clear need
for further research. Closely held firms with employee ownership tend
to have a greater share of the firm that is employee owned on average
and are more likely than publicly traded firms to be majority owned by
employees,3 which makes them particularly important to study in order
to understand the impacts of high levels of employee ownership and the
role of a highly concentrated ownership culture in stability, survival,
and productivity. The major research difficulty in studying closely held
firms is the lack of sufficient data, since little of their information is
publicly available.
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Finally, our core analysis on employment stability and firm survival
is based on data on employee ownership in deferred compensation
plans. This is largely a data availability constraint—we use one of the
few large data sets available that contain information on employee ownership—namely, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Form 5500 pension
records. A large portion of employee ownership in the United States
occurs through ESOPs, which are covered by Form 5500. Data on direct,
broad-based employee ownership at the firm or worker level—through
ESOPs, exercised stock options, or open market purchases—are scarce.
There is information on compensation composition, including compensation consisting of stock and stock option holdings, available from the
Standard and Poor’s Compustat Execucomp database, but this focuses
only on the top five highest-paid executives at each firm and therefore
precludes the analysis of broad-based employee ownership. We believe
the collection of large-scale data on all forms of employee ownership
holdings within firms would be of tremendous benefit to employee
ownership research.
Given the results in this book and the high stakes involved in
employment stability and firm survival, there would be a potentially
large payoff to further research on employee ownership in both publicly
traded and closely held firms.

POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS
Public policies are commonly justified by market failures such as
externalities, incomplete information, and public goods. With respect to
the second source of interest—greater job security and firm survival—
the decision to lay off workers or close a firm can create a number of
negative externalities, including
• negative effects on consumer purchasing power and aggregate
demand,
• higher government expenditures on unemployment compensation and other forms of support for dislocated workers and economically stressed families,4
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• potentially harmful effects on communities, such as increased
crime and a decreased tax base for supporting schools and infrastructure, and
• potentially harmful social and personal effects, such as marital
breakups and alcohol abuse.
These externalities are illustrated by an estimate based on the General Social Survey (GSS) data that the federal government saved $13.7
billion per year in tax revenue and unemployment compensation over
the period 2002–2010 because of the lower layoff rates among employee
owners (Employee Ownership Foundation 2013; Rosen 2013).
The third source of interest in employee ownership—more-broadly
shared prosperity—can also be seen as a form of positive externality
that may justify supportive public policy. Raising the incomes of middle- and lower-class workers can help mitigate the increasing inequality of income and wealth. Extreme inequality may pose dangers to the
viability of a representative democracy, as was believed by several of
the founding fathers and argued recently by Stiglitz, among others. Stiglitz (2013a,b) has also made the case that inequality is harmful to macroeconomic growth and stability. This is supported by OECD studies
that have found that countries with increasing inequality had slower
growth, are more prone to recessions, and had more severe responses
to the 2008 crisis.5 The greater economic stability in more equal societies may be due to more purchasing power in the hands of middle- and
lower-class citizens. In addition, low incomes and high inequality are
linked to a variety of economic and social problems, including reduced
educational performance, mental and physical health problems, teenage births, incarceration, and decreased economic prospects and social
mobility for one’s children (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). The evidence
presented here is consistent with prior evidence that employee ownership tends to come on top of other pay and wealth, indicating that it can
play a role in improving incomes across the economic spectrum.
The first and fourth sources of interest in employee ownership—
1) increased economic performance and 4) less labor-management conflict and higher quality of work life—do not generally involve externalities, since most of the gains should be captured by the participating
firms and workers (although there may be some positive externalities
such as increased innovation that create wider benefits, and higher economic performance and lower conflict may contribute to employment
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growth and stability, which have positive effects on the economy as
a whole).6 If employee ownership helps to create higher productivity
and better quality of work life, this should provide good private incentives for firms to adopt employee ownership, as well as for workers to
join such firms. There may nonetheless be a case for supportive public
policy based upon information problems or institutional barriers that
limit the adoption of employee ownership. The “public good” nature of
information means that there can be a role for government to improve
economic performance by spreading information on best practices. This
is a common role for government; examples include the long history
of agricultural extension services through land-grant universities (since
1887) to spread information on best practices in farming, and employer
education conducted by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration on safety practices that can decrease employer costs and improve
firm performance by reducing turnover and lost work time from injuries
and illnesses.
In sum, employee ownership can improve individual firm performance, and this provides a case for firms to adopt these performanceenhancing practices. The government can play a valuable role in spreading this information. Furthermore, there is a strong case for supportive
public policy of employee ownership if employee ownership firms lay
off fewer workers and are more likely to survive, because of the negative externalities of layoffs and firm failures that are borne by workers,
families, communities, and the larger economy and society. In addition,
a policy case can be built on increasing broad-based prosperity, which
can reduce inequality and strengthen democracy.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The European Union (EU) highlighted employee ownership and
profit sharing in its four reports from 1991 to 2008 on Promotion of
Employee Participation in Profits and Enterprise Results (the “Pepper
Reports”), including a summary of the variety of fiscal and tax incentives provided by EU countries for employee ownership, stock options,
and profit sharing in its 2008 report. The United States has had a variety
of incentives for ESOPs since the 1980s, though some were eliminated
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during the first Bush administration.7 Employer contributions to ESOPs
are tax deductible, but that is the case for all eligible pension plans. The
major surviving tax incentive specific to employee ownership is the
ability for retiring owners to avoid capital gains taxes if they sell to an
ESOP owning at least 30 percent of the company.
Past experience has shown that government legislation promoting
employee ownership can increase the adoption and use of employee
ownership schemes. This was true with tax advantages for firms that
have ESOPs in the United States, tax incentives to individuals for
employee ownership in the United Kingdom, and tax advantages to
firms and individuals for profit sharing in France, among other examples. There is a positive correlation between supportive legislation and
prevalence, making a case that government backing and support can be
effective.
So what are some concrete policy recommendations that can lead to
increased prevalence of broad-based employee share ownership in our
society? In what follows, we present a list of policy options. The empirical analysis in this book has focused on the population of U.S. firms that
are publicly traded on the stock market, and many of the policy options
below have special relevance to publicly traded firms. However, there
are several options that will encourage closely held companies, also.
In particular, options 1, 2, 3, and 5, below, will likely have the biggest
impact on publicly traded firms, while the other options will be relevant
for both publicly traded and closely held companies.
We start our list of recommendations with tax and expenditure policies that our results suggest may be justified by positive externalities
such as lower unemployment. Such policy options include the following seven:
1) Inducing financial firms to invest in or loan money to firms
with broad-based employee ownership. Financial institutions
could deduct a portion of the interest income from loans to
employee ownership firms. This policy existed in the 1980s,
but despite its success in stimulating interest among financial institutions, the program was cut back as part of deficitreduction measures.
2) Restricting tax deductibility of incentive pay for top executives (stock, bonuses, stock options) to companies that have a
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similar type of incentive for all employees. This would make
incentive plans subject to the same conditions that exist for
pensions and health insurance plans: they are tax deductible
only if they are broad based, not limited to a small group. This
would not prevent firms from having special incentive plans
for top executives, but would simply establish that such plans
should not be given tax privileges.
3) Making a minimal program of employee ownership a precondition for the numerous corporate tax incentives in the tax
code. This is in the spirit of George Washington’s tax credit
for cod fishing ships that required a profit-sharing plan for any
ships benefiting from the credit.
4) Expanding eligibility for exemption from capital gains taxes
for retiring owners selling to an ESOP. Currently, this is not
available to S corporations, which have been rapidly growing
in the past decade.8
5) Extending tax deductibility from deferred to nondeferred
employee ownership plans. At present, the United States only
provides tax incentives for deferred employee ownership plans
through the ERISA law of 1974. Federal legislation could
provide tax breaks to firms that provide direct broad-based
employee ownership of stock and stock options.
6) Requiring or favoring firms with broad-based ownership plans
in government procurement. The federal government currently
spends large sums procuring goods and services from companies. These firms that hold federal contracts are already subject
to certain special laws—for example, laws that govern diversity. The U.S. government could require federal contractors to
incorporate broad-based employee ownership for doing business with the federal government (for example, based on the
objective scorecard proposed in point 12, below).
7) Having federal, state, and local economic development authorities give special attention to firms with broad-based equity
ownership programs in awarding tax abatements to businesses
for social improvement projects.
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Apart from the tax and expenditure policies, there are a number of
policies to spread information or break down institutional barriers that
limit adoption; these low-cost policies can be justified under each of the
reasons for interest in employee ownership. Policies that spread information include these five:
8) Establishing a national commission to “assess different inclusive capitalist initiatives and evaluate ways to improve and
promote them in American society” (Blasi, Freeman, and
Kruse 2013, p. 198). The United States has often used commissions to draw attention and expertise to national issues.
9) Establishing an office to support broad-based capitalism within
the White House, reviewing public policies and working with
the private sector to publicize and encourage best practices.
10) Providing seed grants to establish employee ownership
resource centers in each state, modeled on the successful centers in Ohio and Vermont that assist local businesses with transitions to employee ownership and provide ongoing technical
assistance, support, and networking.
11) Establishing programs in the Small Business Administration to
educate owners of small- and medium-sized businesses about
employee ownership options and to work with state programs
in providing assistance to firms in creating employee ownership trusts to buy out retiring owners.
12) Creating an objective scorecard of employee ownership and
profit sharing that can be used by workers, investors, and government officials in measuring the spread of these programs
in individual firms and throughout the economy. This would
include common measures of the percentages of employees
covered by different types of plans, and the size and distribution of their financial stakes in these plans.
A final low-cost idea offered here involves expanding state policies
to allow firms with financial participation to form and operate more
easily:
13) In the United States, firms incorporate at the state level, and
states can amend their laws on corporations to create legal
forms that make it easier for firms to make decisions consis-
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tent with the goal of broadening financial participation. Since
2010, 28 states have passed laws creating a new type of corporation, called the B corporation (short for “Benefit corporation”), which makes it easier for businesses to take employee,
community, and environmental interests into consideration
when making decisions.9 A firm with broad-based employee
ownership incorporated as a B corporation has greater options
to maintain its programs than a firm incorporated under different provisions.

CONCLUSION
Combining our findings with the empirical literature as a whole,
we see a body of evidence showing that, despite the theoretical freerider and financial risk objections raised against it, employee ownership
is generally linked to increased worker performance and commitment,
enhanced employee cooperation toward firm goals, lower turnover,
higher pay, and wealth, as well as to improved firm-level outcomes such
as higher productivity, greater employment stability, and firm survival.
These benefits—particularly the greater stability and survival, which
can help the overall economy by reducing unemployment and resisting recessionary pressures—can provide a clear justification for widespread government support to broaden employee ownership programs.

Notes
1. The t- and z-statistics are higher on employee owners as a percentage of all
employees, compared to the other measures, indicating that this employee ownership variable explains a greater share of the variance in stability and survival.
This conclusion is reinforced by the finding that the magnitudes of moving from
no employee ownership to high levels of employee ownership are larger for this
variable.
2. Relatedly, our analysis of publicly traded companies skews our sample toward
large and historically successful companies.
3. “The median percentage ownership for ESOPs in public firms is about 5 percent. . . .
The median percentage ownership for private firms is about 30–50 percent, with
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4.

5.
6.
7.

8.
9.

about 4,000 companies now 100 percent employee-owned by ESOPs (a percentage that is increasing steadily).” See NCEO (2016).
Unemployment Insurance is experience rated so that employers with higher levels
of layoffs pay more into the system, but the payments are not directly proportional, so that employers do not absorb the full costs of the UI for workers they
dismiss.
See Aiginger and Guger (2012); OECD (2016).
See Brill (2012) on how S corporation ESOPs may justify favorable tax treatment
by contributing to higher economic growth in both recession and nonrecession
periods.
A federal law that was instituted in 1984 with strong bipartisan support, Internal
Revenue Code Section 133 gave tax incentives to banks and financial institutions
lending money to companies to set up ESOPs. Specifically, the lender was able to
deduct from its corporate taxes half of its interest income on the loan to set up the
ESOP. Section 133 provided a strong incentive for setting up ESOPs at corporations, but it was substantially repealed during the first Bush administration in a
wave of deficit-reduction initiatives.
A bipartisan bill has been introduced to extend this tax treatment to S corporations.
See http://esca.us/2016/04/press-release-esca-members-to-testify-today-at-house
-committee-on-small-business-hearing-on-s-esops/.
The purpose of a B corporation includes creating general public benefit, which is
defined as a material positive impact on society and the environment. A B corporation’s directors and officers operate the business with the same authority as in a
traditional corporation but are required to consider the impact of their decisions
not only on shareholders but also on society and the environment. The B corporation can refuse to sell itself to the highest bidder, can operate with a longer-term
financial horizon, and can value interests beyond maximizing shareholder wealth,
in ways that other corporations cannot easily do.
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